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1. INTRODUCTION
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), by
their terms, bar lawyers from engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
1 T h e  M o d e l  
R u l e s  
a l s o  
p r e v e n
t  
l a w -
yers from circumventing the rules by proxy. Yet, lawyers throughout the
United States supervise undercover investigators who misrepresent their
identities in  order to garner admissions or other evidence from unsus-
ecting would-be adversaries. These adversaries believe that they are
dealing with members of the general public, not investigators who plan
to help arrest or sue them.
There has been some debate about whether lawyer involvement in
undercover deception is or should be barred by the literal language o f
Model Rule 8.4, which proscribes deceit and dishonesty? There is a ten-
sion between the language of the Model Rules and the actual practice in
most jurisdictions, in which government lawyers, especially prosecutors,
regularly supervise undercover investigations. Lawyers who supervise
undercover investigations employ deception, albeit, generally speaking,
indirectly through investigators. A  federal prosecutor supervising a
criminal terrorism investigation approves o f the use o f  a false name and
identity by the undercover investigator. A  civil rights attorney preparing
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to bring a civil housing discrimination case assists an undercover investi-
gator in assuming a false name and identity that is used to deceive the
target of the investigation, who presumably would not make damaging
admissions to a fully-disclosed agent of a civil rights organization.
A few recent examples help to illustrate the need for more guidance
in attorney-supervised investigations. The Hewlett-Packard scandal di-
rected public attention not only on pretexting,
3 b u t  o n  t h e  
w h o l e  
p a n o p l y
of undercover investigations, as well as attorneys' responsibility for the
techniques utilized by investigators under the attorneys' supervision.
4 I nthe course of investigating corporate leaks to the press from a member of
the Hewlett-Packard board of directors, HP in-house counsel Kevin Hun-
saker approved the use of pretexting by investigators, who then obtained
confidential phone records not only from the suspected board members,
but also from nine journalists and their relatives.
5 T h e  i n v e s t i g aposed as the target board members in order to illegally obtain confiden-
tial telephone records.
6 _Another illustration of attorney s pen isior of undercover investi-
n ) ogations arises from a recent Wisconsin case.7 A F
e
b r u a r y  d e c i s i o n
by a WiSCODSiii referee exonerated criminal defense lawyer Stephen Hur-
ley, whose investigator used a ruse to trick a teenage boy into exchang-
ing his computer for a new laptop.
8 H u r l e y  
r e p i e s e n t e d  
a  
s u s p e c t  
a c -
cused of  child molestation.
9 H i s  
i n v e s t i g a t o r
,  
u s i n g  
a  
f a l s
e  
p r e t e
n s e ,
tricked the complaining witness into sumndering his computer, which
contain d evidence of p rnography obtained fro in other sources.
113 ' T h eWisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation tiled an ethics complaint against
Hurley- alleging that the investigation involved fraud, deception and dis-
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inafter Supreme Court Referee].
9. Supreme Court Referee, sup a note 8.
10. Id
can R • O'Brien, Effective Lis of Private Investigators by illtorneys
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honesty." But  the special referee dismissed the charges, noting that the
ethics rule was vague, ill-defined, and in any event trumped by the law-
yer's duty to his c lient.
I2 
M o r e o v e r ,  
i t  
w a s  
t h e  
i n v e s t








yer, who engaged in deception. The court-appointed referee, noting that
"[a] man's liberty was at stake," stated that the lasAryer's conduct, while
deceitful, was not unethical."
Some courts and commentators have opined that deception is sim-
ply never permitted by attorneys under any circumstances.
14 I n  c o n t r a s t ,other jurisdictio s have amended their ethics rules to permit lawyers to
supervise undercover investigations, but only government lawyers, and
only in criminal prosecutions." A  few authorities have held that decep-
tive undercover investigative techniques are permitted to combat dis-
crimination and to enforce trademarks." This  Article argues that it is
inherently subjective and value-laden to posit that one substantive sub-
ject area of the law justifies indirect deception, while another does not.
This Article recommends that ethics rules should focus on the conduct of
the attorney, rather than on the subject matter of the specific case or on
the status of the attorney's client.
For the sake of this Article, attorney supervision of undercover in-
vestigations will be analyzed along two conceptual axes. Ax is  1 consid-
ers the nature of the substantive subject matter of the underlying claim
(e.g., trademark or criminal) and the status of  the attorney (public vs.
private or plaintiff vs. defense). This approach will be called the "status-
based axis?"
17 
A x i s  
2  
f o c u






























gator, as the attomey's agent. The Axis 2 factors include the following:
the extent of the misrepresentation; whether the deceit is direct or indi-
rect; the existence of other, alternative methods of obtaining the same
evidence; and whether the questioned conduct violates another ethics
rule or principle of substantive law. Such rules include the "no-contact




14. See, e.g., In re Pautler, 47 1
3
. 3d  1 1 7 5 ,  
1 1 8 0  
( C o l o .  
2 0 0 2 )  
( e n  
b a n c
)  
( " [ P ]
r o s e c u t
o r s  
c a n
n o t
involve themselves in deception, even with selfless motives ...." ) ; Michael Bonsignore, Rules Exist
for  a Reason: A Commentary on Lawyers Hiring Investigators to Partake in Deceptive Tactics, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655, 662 (2008) ("Allowing either direct deceptive tactics, or employing an
investigator to engage in such tactics, when the information is attainable within the system is incon-
gruent with the moral basis of the adversarial system.").
15. See infra Part V.
16. See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int l  Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (3.1%/..1.
1998).
17. Alternatively, Axis 1 could be labeled the "subject-matter axis" because it is dependent on
the substantive nature of the client's underlying claim.
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pretexting and breach of privacy, some of which were adopted in the
wake of the 2006 Hewlett-Packard corporate scanda1.
18 The development of status-based exceptions to ABA Model Rule
8.4—exceptions based on the status of the attorney or the client's under-
lying substantive claim—raises interesting and troubling issues. Where
will the line be drawn? Should attorney-supervised undercover investi-
gations be limited to certain substantive areas of practice? I f  a prosecu-
tor can employ an undercover investigator to deceive others in a death
penalty case, perhaps the defense attorney in the same case should be
permitted to instruct an investigator to take the same liberties with the
truth. Arguably, preventing the conviction of an innocent defendant is as
worthy a goal as securing the conviction of a guilty suspect. The same
types of questions can be posed for attorneys defending intellectual prop-
erty and civil rights cases for whom there has been little, if  any, authority
justifying deceptive investigations. By  the same token, we can compare
other social values, such as protecting the environment, preventing
workplace accidents, or even saving human life, with the values that jus-
tify deception in trademark and discrimination cases. I f  attorneys can
indirectly deceive in order to protect a property right, then why not per-
mit lying to protect our environment or to rectify a less lofty civil wrong?
Part II of this Article briefly sketches the overall ethical framework
under the ABA Model Rules and the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, including the proscription on deceit and misrepresenta-
tion in Model Rule 8.4 and the ban on attorney contact with represented
adverse parties in Model Rule 4.2. Par t I ll describes the jurisdictions
that have declined to create status-based exceptions to Model Rule 8.4,
and the nationwide uproar created when the Oregon Supreme Court ini-
tially refused to permit undercover investigations involving any decep-
tion—including investigations by law enforcement personnel. That Part
will also trace the subsequent adoption of a new rule in Oregon, which
now permits all attorneys, regardless of public or private status, to super-
vise investigations involving deceit, provided that there is evidence of
underlying unlawful conduct. Part IV describes the development of sta-
tus-based exceptions, which have authorized government lawyers to su-
pervise undercover criminal investigations and have permitted plaintiffs'
lawyers to dispatch testers in intellectual property and civil rights cases.
Part V explains efforts by various state bars to reconcile the conflict
between the literal language of the Model Rules and the common prac-
tice, in which lawyers indeed have participated in undercover investiga-
tions involving trickery and deception. Part VI argues that status-based
18. See Bridget M. Rohde, Another Nail in the Pretexting Coffin, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 2007, at 4.
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distinctions have outlived their purpose and should be reconsidered. F i-
nally, Part VII suggests a number of conduct-based factors that should be
used to analyze the conduct of all lawyers, regardless of an attomey's
status or nature of the client's substantive legal claim.
II. ABA MODEL RULES FRAMEWORK
A. Deceit and Dishonesty
Our analysis begins with the ABA Model Rules of  Professional
Conduct, which outline lawyers' responsibilities to their clients, to tribu-
nals, and to others. The Model Rules proscribe deception in Rule 8.4,
which provides in pertinent part as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation . . . . 19
The comments to Rule 8.4 add a gloss on the types of illegal con-
duct that would constitute professional misconduct: "Many kinds of ille-
gal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law," generally crimes
of what used to be called "moral turpitude."
213 W h i l e  a  
l a w y e r  i s  
p e r s o n -
ally answerable to the entire criminal law, "a lawyer should be profes-
sionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those charac-
teristics relevant to law practice."
21 T h i s  
c o m m e n t  
h a s  
b e e n  




in an influential article by David Isbell and Lucantonio Salvi, who argue
that its languag  modifies Rule 8.4(c), which should accordingly be read
to prohibit only that dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
adversely affects a lawyer's fitness to practice law.
22 A c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e s e19. MODEL RULES R. 8.4.
20. Id. cmt. 2.
21. Id.
22. David Isbell & Lueantonio Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Un-
dercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Mis-
representation Under the Model Rules of  Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791
(1995).
128 S e a t t l e  University Law Review[
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authors, the proscription of deceit in Rule 8.4( )  should apply only to
grave misconduct that would not only be generally reproved if  commit-
ted by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawy
-
er, b u t  w o u l d  
b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  
o f

























































crimination, it is socially desirable, and the use of testers is not the kind
of deception forbidden by Rule 8.4
24 While Isbell and Salvi's article has had some traction, and has even
inspired an amendment in state ethics codes,
25 t h e i r  a p p r o a c h  
h a s  
h a d  
i t s
critics. One commentator noted that Comment [2] to Rule 8.4, judging
from its context, is intended to interpret Rule 8.4(h) only, by specifying
the type of criminal act that "reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer d '
2 6  t i n d e r  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s ,  
C o m -
ment [2] does not seem to apply to "conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud," etc., under subseetion (c), but only to criminal conduct which
involves_ moral turpitude under subsection (b). O n  the other hand, all
fraud, misrepresentation and deceit are proscribed by th.e. literal language
of Rule 8.4(c) (which is not limited to conduct affecting a lawyer's fit-
,  21ness to practice
)
.
'Me Model Rules further prohibit a lawyer from using a proxy to
indirectly do 1+121 which the lawyer may not duo irectly. As noted above,
Rule 8.4(a) provides that a lawyer may not knowingly violate a discipli-
nary rule, "or do so through the acts of another.”
28 C o m m e n t  [ 1 ]  
t o  t h e
same rule pro-vid s that lawyers may not violate the Model Rules
"through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to
do so on the lawyer's behalf."
29 I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  
M o d e l  
R u l e  
5 3  
p r o v i
d e s
that lawyers are responsible for the actions of nonlawyers and subordi-
23.1d. at 817.
24. Id. at 801-04.
25. See infra Part V. For  example, Virginia amended its version of Model Rule 8.4 to prohibit
that deception "which adversely affects an attomey's fitness to practice law." See VA- RULES OF
PROPL CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008.)
26. Thomas H. Moore, can Prosecutors Lie?, 17 GEO. .1. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 970 (2004).
According to Moore, "Comment 2 clearly speaks only to 'illeg,a1 activity,' which is the subject of
Model Rule 8.4(h). Rule 8.4(b) is also the only section of Rule 8,4 that refers to ' the lawyees
fitness as a lawyer." h i  at 971. While Moore is probably literally correct, this does not solve the
problem posed by this Article: i f  deception is to be permitted, the Rules should be amended, as ar-
gued below.-
: 27. Model Rule 4.1, entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to Others," forbids a 'a P r  from














































































Comin. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Opinion 06-439 (2006) (discussing a lawyer
duty toavidmsrepnugl). 28. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(a),
29. Id. cnit.l.
20081 D e c e p t i o n  in Undetcover I n ve s t ig a
t io n s
nate lawyers they supervise: A lawyer who retains associates or employsa nol-w
yer—includg avstiator-"shal mkerasonable efforts
to ensure that the pe,rson's conduct is compatible with  the professional
obligations of the lawyer."
3c1 A  l a w y e r  
m a y  
b e  
d i s c i p l i






d u c t
of an investig tor that the lawyer orders, approves, or ratifies,
31 W  wil l  now consider the ABA Model Code o f  Professional
sponsibility (the "Code"), which antedated the Model Rules. L ik e  the
subsequent Model Rules, the Code similarly prohibits deceit and misrep-
resentat1ons.
32 
D i s c i p
l i n a r y  
R u

























not [ e ] n g a g e  in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude."
33 D R  I  -02.(A)(3) o f  the Code provides: " A  l a
,
, v y e r  s h a l l  
n o t  [ e ]
n g a g e
conduct involving dishonesty, fi
-
a u d ,  d e c e i t ,  
o r  
m i s r e p r e s e n t
a t i o n . "
3 4  
D R
7-I 0'2(A)(5) provides, " In  the representation o f  a client, a lawyer shall
no t ; .  [k]nowing ly make a false statement of law or fact."
35 T h u s ,  l i k ethe Model Rules, the Code proscribes lawyer conduct involving fraud,
isrepresentation, and d ception.
o-C'ontact Rule
Model Rule 4-.2, also known as the 'no-contact „ e ,
3 6  b a r stomey from communicating with represented adverse parties:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate abou
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer
30. MODEL RULES R. 5.3(b).
31. MODEL RuLES R. 5.3(e); see also Rebucca Graves Payne, Investigative Tactics. They May
Be Legal, But Are They Ethical?, 35 JAIN COLO. LAW_ 43 (2006).
32. The Code is discussed here because i t informs many of the earlier decisionS discussed in
this Article, including decisions from New York, Colorado, and Oregon. I n  2007, the New York
State Bar Association approved the recommendation of  its Committee on Standards of Anorney
Conduct to adapt the Model Rules format. T he changeover is still subject to approval of  New
York's Appellate Division.
33. MODEL CODE OF PROE'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(3) (1969). [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]. in New York„ the Disciplinary
, R u l e s  o f  
t h e  C o d e  
o f  
P r o f e s s i o n
a l  
R e s p o n s i





ly provides as foll ws: "A lawyer or law firm shall not .  irs'ingage in illegal conduct that adversely
reflects on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer," 22 NEW YORK: CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY * 1200_3(A)(3) (2008) [hereinafter NY CODE].
34. MODEL CODE DR 1-1020)(4), New York's rola is similar, exec. that  1- extends the pro-
hibition to "a lawyer
-
or  l a w  
fi r m "  




1 2 . 0 0 .
3 ( A )
( 4 ) .
35. MODEL CODE DR I
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1 0 2 ( a ) ( 5 )  
( c i t e d  
i n  
R I C H
A R D  
A .  
Z I T















STATUTES AND COMPARISONS 495 (Lexis Nexis 200$)). The New York Code provision is the same.
NEW YORK LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY D R  7-102(A)(5); N Y  CODE
I200.33(A)(5).
36. See generally USA G. LERMAN 8z, PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 695 n.25 (2d ed. 2008) (referring to "anti contact" rule); Julian J. Moore, Horne
Sweet Home: Examining the (Mis)Applicaiion of the Anti-Contact Rule to Housing Discrimination
Testers, 25 J. LEGAL PROF_ 75 (20(1 I).
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the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a
court order."
This Rule is important to our analysis, as the use o f deception in many
undercover investigations is often intertwined with attorney contact with
represented parties.
The comments to Model Rule 4.2 indicate that it is not intended to
bar contact with all representatives of an adverse, represented organiza-
t ion :
38
In the case o f a represented organization, this Rule prohibits com-
munications with a constituent of the organization who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concern-
ea the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with re-
spect to the matter or whose a t  or omission in connection with the






















Violations o f  the no-contact rule have sometimes, but not always,r e -
suited in  suppression o f  evidence improperly obtained, and sanctic
against the supervising lawyers.
-While a detailed analysis of the no-contact nile is outside the scope
of this Article, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Midwest Motor Sports v.
Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., is illustrative! Th a t  case involved a commercial
disputebetween a franchisor of snowmobiles and its former franchisee, a
retail snowmobile dealer. 42 The  former dealer niatmed titat it  had been
unfairly cashiered in favor of another, competing dealer:
43 T h e  c a s e  w a sin litigation, the partie  w re represented by counsel, and discovery was
on2oing. Nonetheless, the franchisor's attorneys dispatched hn under_
cover invesfigator to view the franchisees' showroom and surreptitiously
tape record conversations with its sales sta f f "  Withou t  revealing his
identity, the investigator posed as a consumer and queried the sales staff,
as well as the president o f  the terminated dealer, who was an adverse
party represented by counselBecaus thinvestigator was dispatched by counsel, the conduct
was improper. Th e  investigator's purpose "was to elicit specific admis-
'37. MODEL RULES R. 4.2. •
38. See Id cmt. 7_
39. Id; see also Niesig v. Teara 1, 558 N.E 2d 1030 (N.Y



























































44. Id. at 695.
45. Id. at 695-96.
d 693 (8th Cir. 2003).
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 sions" from an adverse, represented party on issues relevant to the litiga-
tion "that could have been obtained properly through the use of formal
discovery techniques."
46 i n  
f a c t ,  
t h e  
f r a n c h i
s o r  
h a
d  
r e c e
n t l y  
s e r
v e d  
a



























































derly discovery procedures. Thus, the conduct in Midwest Motor Sports
violated the no-contact rule.
48 The no-contact rule has also been appied te the conduct of federal
prosecutors. I n  U.S. v. Hainmad, an assistant United States attorney in-
structed a cooperating informant to surreptitiously wear a wire in order to
obtain incriminating evidence from the target of a fraud investigation.
49The informant handed the target a sham subpoena prepared by the assis-
tant United States atteme:
y
'.' A f t e r  
h e  
w a s  
a r r e s t e
d ,  
t h e  
t a r g
e t  
s o u
g h t  
t
o
suppress the evidence obtained by the informant. He argued that during
the investigation he had been represented by counsel; therefore, the gov-
ernm nt had, by proxy, violated DR 7-1 04(A)(1) of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which prohibits attorneys from knowingly contact-
ing represented adverse parties.
51 T h e  
d i s t r i c t  
c o u r t  
g r a n t e d  
t h e  
m o t i
o n
to suppress, reasoning that the informant was the government's "alter
ego," but the court of appeals reversed:
2 T h e  c o u r t  
r e j e c t e d  
t h e  
g o v e r n -
ment's contention that the no-contact rule "is  inapplicable to criminal
inv stigations under any circumstances," finding instead that it may in-
deed apply and that it was violated on the facts of the case before
Determined to hedge its bets, the court considered the "authorized by
_ law" exception to DR 7-1 04, and reasoned that a prosecutor is "'author-
ized by law' to employ
- l e g i t i m a t e  
i n v e s t i g
a t i v e  
t e c h n




d u c t
i n g
r supervising criminal investigations, and the use of informants to gath-
er evidence against a suspect will frequently fail within the ambit of such
authorization."
54 
N o n e t h




















rule by giving the informant a fake subpoena "to create a pretense that
might h lp t e informant elicit admissions from a represented suspect."'
While finding a breach of the disciplinary rolesc o u r t  of appeals de-
46. Id. at 699.
47. M at 696.
48. Id, a  6'48.
49. United States v. Hammad, 858 R2d 834, 835-36 (2d Cir,
50. M at 836_
51. Id.; see also Mona. CODE DR 7 04(A)(1)
52. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 837,
53. Id. at 837-38.
54. M at 839.
55. M
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cfined to exclude the evidence due to the unsettled nature of the law in
the area.
56
THE ZERO TOLERANCE ZONE: N O SUBJECT-MATTER EXCEPTIONS
Some authorities, as we will see, have recognized some societal
goals that are sufficiently important to justify the use of undercover in-
vestigations involving deception.
57 O t h e r  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
i n  




announced a ze o tolerance policy for attorney deceit in investigations."
These auth rities reason that the Model Rules clearly proscribe decep-
tion, misrepresentation, and deceit.
59 T o  p u t  
i t  s i m p l y ,  
l y i n g  
i s  
m o r a l l
y
and ethically wrong, and lawyers shouldn't do it.
A. May Lawyers Ever Lie?
Many commentators have reflected on the tension between the law-
yer's duty of zealous advocacy to clients and the duty to refrain from
misrepresentations and deceit.
6° T h e r e  
a r e  
m o r e  
t h a n  
a  
f e w  




take a dim view of attorneys who resort to deception.
6I S o m e  c o m m e n t a -tors hav  posited that lawyers should never lie, that lying is morally and
ethically wrong, and that it is never justified, even to save a human life.
62Many lawyers have bemoaned the profession's loss of prestige and note
that the general public views lawyers as less than tmthful.
63 Philosopher Sissela Bok has argued that deception can be morally
justified in some circumstances, e.g., to save a human life, or when sur-
56. Id. at 842.
57. See, e.g., Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22; Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int' l  Collectors Soc'y, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 456,475 (DIU. 1998).
58. In re Pautler, 47 P3c1 1175 (Colo. 2002) (en banc); In re Malone, 105 A.11).2d 455, 455
(N.Y. 1984).
59. Pautler, 47 1
3
. 3d 
1 1 7 5 .
60. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries
of the Law: Misdirection, Lying and "Lying With An Explanation", 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53 (2002).
61. Pautler, 47 P. 3d 1175; Malone, 105 A.13.2d 455.
62. See generally Rebecca B. Cross, Ethical Deception by Prosecutors, 31 FORDHAM URB.
215, 230 (2003) (collecting authorities on whether lying is ever permitted, and concluding that some
circumstances do permit deception). See also Bonsignore, supra note 14 (stating that "(1) a lawyer
should play no part in dissemblance, except under extreme duress, especially in hiring or being af-
filiated with an investigator who engages in deceptive tactics while working for  that attorney; (2)
when a lawyer engages in, authorizes or otherwise participates in dissemblance directly or indirectly,
he or she undermines the values of the American adversarial legal system.").
63. See E. Cli ff Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed Com-
mentary to Rule 4.1 of the Model Roles of Professional Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 779
(2002) (reporting that "a poll revealed that one-third of the American public thinks that lawyers are
less truthful than most people").
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vival is otherwise at risk.
64 S o m e  
l e g a l  
s c h o l a r
s  




d e c e
p t i o n  
a n
d
misdirection are inherent in the practice of law, and/or are justified by























































gued that Model Rule 8.4 does not proscribe all deceit and misrepresen-
tation, but only that which rises to the level of what used to be known as
moral tutpitude.
66 
A c c o r d i
g  
t o  
t h e
s e  
a u t
h o r






i p t i







8.4(c) "should apply only to grave misconduct that would not only be
generally reproved if  committed by anyone, whether lawyer or nonlawy-
er, but would be considered of such gravity as to raise questions as to a
person's fitness to be a lawyer."
67 T h i s  
a p p r o a c h ,  
w h i c h  
w o u l d  
a p p r o
v e
deception under some circumstances, has had some traction with state
bar associatio s and ethics committees.
This Article accepts the proposition that some level of deception is
acceptable by attorneys acting through investigators. The strongest case
for undercover investigations is presented by the federal prosecutor su-
pervising an undercover investigation of a terrorist ring. However, once
a single court approves any use of deception by any lawyer, it is fair to
debate the use of deception in other areas of the law by other lawyers.
The tension between lawyers' several conflicting duties forms a
backdrop for ongoing debates in the various states—as well as nation-
ally—about whether attorneys may resort to deception under any circum-
stances. For  example, in Colorado, the state supreme court refused to
carve out a law enforcement exception to the honesty provisions of the
state ethics code.
68 T w o  
o t h e r  
j u r i s d
i c t i o n
s  
h a











forcement officers who coached witnesses to lie under oath.
69 A n d  i nOregon, an absolutist prohibition on attorney deception in investigations
resulted in a rule change explicitly permitting undercover investigations
without reference to the underlying subject matter of the claim or case.
70The following section will examine these authorities from Colorado,
Oregon, New York, and Illinois.
64. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 108
-
09  ( V i n t a g e
Books 1989). Bok  argues that lying to save an innocent life is morally justified. Id. at 109. How-
ever, she expresses doubt about whether lying can be otherwise justified in the name of the public
good. Id. at 176-80.
65. Cross, supra note 62; Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of  Overzealous Representation—
Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771,772
(2006).
66. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22.
67. M at 817.
68. See In re Pautler, 47 1
3
. 3d 1 1 7 5  
( C o l o .  
2 0 0 2 )  
( e n  
b a n c
) .
69. In re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455, 455 (N.Y. 1984); In re Friedman, 392 IsI.E.2d 1333 (111.
1979).
70. See infra Part III.D; In re Gatti 8 P.3c1966 (Or. 2000).
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B. In re Pautler: The Deception Which Helped Capture an Axe Murderer
The unforgettable facts of In re Pautler arose in rural Colorado.
71William Neal was a multiple axe murderer.
72 H e  m u r d e r e d  
t h r e e  
w o m e n
and raped a fourth, whom he was holding as a hostage.
73 I n  a  t e l e p h o n econversation with Colorado police authorities while he was still at large,
Neal agreed to surr nder, but only if  represented by counse1.
74 T h e  p o -lice asked Mark Pautler, Chief Deputy District Attorney of  Jefferson
County, Colorado, to help apprehend Neal. Pautler picked up the phone
and impersonated a public defender, inventing the fictitious name, "Mark
Palmer."
75 






































would be separated from other detainees, permitted to smoke, and in the
presence of his lawyer when he surrendered.
76 P a u t l e r  t o l d  
t h e  
s u s p e c t ,
"Right, I ' l l  be present."
77 W h e n  
N e a l  
q u e s t i o
n e d  
t h e  
e r s a




about his rights, Pautler demurred.
78 N e a l  
s u r r e n d e r e d  
w i t h o u t  
i n c i -
dent.'"
Pautler did not reveal his deception to Neal." Following Neal's ar-
raignment, the real public defender appointed to defend Neal recognized
Pautler's voice on a tape recording of the surrender negotiations and re-
ported the deception to the court.
81 T h e  
i n c i d e n t  
s o  
r a t t l e d  
N e a l  
t h a t  
h e
discharged his public defender and proceeded to be convicted and sen-
te ced to death i  a trial in which he represented himself pro se.
82 F r his role in the deception of Neal, Pautler, the prosecutor, was
himself prosecuted by the Colorado attorney disciplinary authorities.
Those authorities imposed discipline on Pautler, including a stayed sus-
pension, additional ethics education, and a retaking of the multistate pro-
fessional responsibility examination.
83 P a u t l e r  
a r g u e d  
t h a t  
h i s  
d e c e p t i o
n
was justified because he was acting in his capacity as a law enforcement
officer, and because the situation presented a threat of "imminent public
harm," as Neal was a killer on the lam who had taken hostages.
84
71. Pauder, 47 1
3
. 3d 
1 1 7 5 .
72. M at 1176-77.
73. M










84. Id at 1179-82.
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The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the discipline, finding that
Pautler had lied to the suspect in violation of  Colorado RPC 8.4(c),
which prohibits fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
85 T h e  c o u r t  
s t a t e d
that "even a noble motive does not warrant departure from the Rules of
Professional Conduct," and that "prosecutors cannot involve themselves
in deception, even with selfless motives."
86 T h e  c o u r t  
r e j e c t e d  
t h e  
a r g u -
ment that Pautler had no alternative to deception, noting that he could
hav  mad  additional efforts to locate a real defense lawyer." Rather,
the court stated:
[W]e reaffirm that members o f  our profession must adhere to the
highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regard-
less of motive. Purposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our
state is intolerable, even when it is undertaken as a part of attempt-
ing to secure the surrender of a murder suspect. A  prosecutor may
not deceive an unrepresented person by impersonating a public de-
fender.
88
In short, Pautler was publicly disciplined for using deception in an
effort to induce a murderer to surrender. The Pautler case, while causing
a national stir among ethicists and prosecutors, did not result in a rule
change or ethics opinion in Colorado.
C. In re Malone and In re Friedman:
Coaching a Witness to Lie Under Oath
Brian Malone, like Mark Pautler, was a public servant with unsel-
fish motives. As  Inspector General of the New York State Department
of Correctional Services, Malone, also an attorney, investigated the bru-
tal beating of an inmate by several corrections officers.
89 M a l o n e  o b -tained the co peration of ne corrections officer who witnessed the inci-
dent but was concerned that the "code of silence" among law enforce-
ment officers would stymie his investigation if  other officers learned of
the cooperation." H e  was also concerned about possible retaliation
against this cooperating witness.
9I I n  o r d e r  
t o  
m a i n t a i n  
t h e  
s e c r e c
y  
o f  
t h e
witness's identity, and to avoid witness intimidation, Malone told the
cooperating witness to give a false sworn statement in which he denied
85. Id at 1184; see COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2008).
86. Pautter, 47 P.3d at 1180.
87 .1d at 1180.
88. Id at 1176.
89. In re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455, 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
90. Id
91. M
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witnessing the use of excessive force on the complaining prisoner.
92 M a -lone secretly took a truthful version of the witness's statement on another
occasion.
93 Malone filed disciplinary charges against the perpetrating officers,
and the erstwhile secret witness testified at an arbitration hearing, where-
upon he first revealed the existence of the two contradictory statements."
Malone was charged with violating New York's Disciplinary Rule 1-102
for instructing a witness to give false testimony.
95 I n  h i s  d e f e n s e ,  
h e  a d -
mitted to counseling the false t stimony, but argued that his advice was
justified by his desire to protect the identity and safety of the witness, to
prevent witness tampering, and to pursue an important investigation into
prison bmtality .
96 
W h i l e  
a c k n o
w l e d g i
n g  
t h
a t  
M a
l o











acted out of a laudable motive, namely, to protect a witness willing to
risk retaliation for breaking the correction officers' 'code of silence,'"
97the appellate division rejected his justification defense and publicly cen-
sured Malone, noting that there were alternative methods to secure the
identity o f  the witness short of  suborning perjured testimony.
98 T h ecourt further observed that the defense of justification, while applicable
to the defendant in a criminal prosecution, did not excuse unethical con-
duct by a lawyer.
99 A similar analysis was applied in In re Fr iedman,
m i n  w h i c h  aprosecutor i structed a witness to lie under oath in order to consummate
a bribery case against a corrupt lawyer.
ml I n  e x c h a n g e  
f o r  a  
$ 5 0  
b r i b e
from a corrupt defense l wyer, a police officer falsely informed the pre-
siding judge in a drunk driving case that the police department's breatha-
lyzer operator would be unavailable to testify in cour t.
102 T h i s  f a l s e
92. Id at 455-56,480 (stating that it was unusual "for a correction officer to voluntarily inform
upon his fellow officers for fear of retaliation for breaking the 'code of silence' which exists among
correction officers").
93. Id at 456.
94. M at 456-57.
95. Id
96. Id at 458-60.
97. Id at 460.
98. Id at 458-59.
99. Id at 459. I t  could even be argued that the creation of false testimony was worse than
unnecessary; it was counterproductive to the government's aims. The creation of a sworn inconsis-
tent statement by the government's star witness would have instantly shattered the credibility of that
witness. A  witness who is willing to lie under oath at the direction of a lawyer is still a liar. Thus, it
is difficult to understand what the inspector general thought he was accomplishing by creating a
double, contradictory record in Malone.
100. In re Friedman, 392 isl.E.2d 1333 (111.1979).
101. Id at 1334.
102. Id
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statement was approved by Friedman, the prosecutor, specifically to
make out a case against the corrupt lawyer who paid the bribe.'"
Friedman argued that his conduct was justified in order to consum-
mate the bribery investigation of corrupt lawyers, and was permitted by

















































house door: "The integrity of the courtroom is so vital to the health of
our legal system that no violation of that integrity, no matter what its mo-
tivation, can be condoned or ignored."
m5 W h i l e  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  
f o u n d  
t h a t
Friedman had violated the Code, it declined to impose a sanction due to
the l ck of authority on the subject.
m6 Of co rse, the act of suborning perjury is of a very different order
of magnitude from misrepresenting one's identity. And the courts that
have explicitly considered the issue from the standpoint of attorney eth-
ics have said that a lawyer may not permit or use perjury, let alone en-
courage i t .
m7
D. In re Gatti: The Lawyer Who Posed as a Chiropractor
In re Gatti 108 prompted much hand-wringing and, ultimately, a re-
vision of the Oregon Code of Professional Conduct.
m9 I t  a l s o  r e s u l t e d  
i n
a categoric l refusal to create tat s-based exceptions to the state disci-
plinary rules proscribing deception.
m Daniel Gatti, an Oregon lawyer, represented chiropractors under
criminal investigation by state prosecutors." The government lawyers
sent undercover investigators, posing as injured patients or janitors, into
the offices of Gatti's chiropractor clients, where those investigators gath-
103. See id
104. Id at. 1334-35.
105. Id at 1335.
106. Id at 1339.
107. Yet federal prosecutors and FBI agents, all of whom were lawyers, fabricated a bevy of
crimes and presented the court with false testimony in Operation Greylord. Al l  of the convictions
were affirmed. As a Seventh Circuit court stated in affirming the conviction of a judge:
In Operation Greylord agents of  the FBI took the stand in the Circuit Court of  Cook
County and lied about their made-up cases. Perjury is a crime, and [defendant] Murphy
tells us that those who commit crimes themselves cannot prosecute others' crimes. But
criminal proceedings are not designed to establish the relative equities among police and
defendants. In many categories of cases it is necessary for the agents to commit acts that,
standing by themselves, are criminal.
United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,1528 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Robert Blecker, Beyond
1984: Undercover in America—Serpico to Abscam, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 823 (1984).
108.8 1
3








109. See discussion infra Part
110. Gatti, 8 1
3
. 3d a t  
9 7 5 .
111.M at 969.
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ered evidence of criminal wrongdoing.112 Gatti filed an ethics complaint
against the prosecutors supervising the investigation, arguing that the
infiltration of his clients' offices under false pretenses was deceptive in
violation of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility."
3 T h estate bar disciplinary board declined to take action, observing that, while
there was no authority directly on point, "[o]ur preliminary conclusion is
that if  [the prosecuting agency] is considered to have public authority to
root out possible fraud, then attorneys assisting [it] in this endeavor are
not acting unethically in providing advice on how to conduct a legal un-
dercover operation."
4 T h e  
s t a t e  
b a r  
c o u n s
e l  
f u r t
h e r  
o p i
n e d  
t h






not aware of any distinction between the standards of conduct applicable
to public- versus private-sector attorneys.
115 Emboldened by the apparent green light from the state bar counsel,
Gatti undertook his own investigation of fraudulent medical review prac-
tices by a medical agency. He telephoned the agency and one of its re-
viewing chiropractors under false pretenses.
116 G a t t i  i d e n t i fi e d  
h i m s e l f
as a chiropractor and obtained nformation in tape-recorded conversa-
tions, which he ultimately used to launch a federal civil lawsuit alleging
fraud against the medical reviewing agency.'" I n  the taped conversa-
tions, Gatti told the agency "that he was interested in working for CMR
[the medical review agency], that he was a doctor, that he saw patients,
that he performed independent medical examinations, and that he was
interested in becoming involved with CMR's educational seminars."
118Thus, Gatti lied about his identity and purpose.
Upon learning o f  Gatti's deception, the medical agency filed a
grievance against him with the state bar, contending that he had violated
DR 1-102 of the Oregon Code by engaging in "conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
119 G a t t i  r e s p o n d e d  
t h a t  
h e
reasonably relied upon the bar cou sel's written response to his own ear-
lier complaint against the government attorneys investigating his clients,
and that he reasonably deduced from that response that the use of decep-
tion in undercover investigations was appropriate and proper by either
government or private attorneys.'" In other words, what is sauce for the
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bar counsel, it  was rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court, which held























































implied that lawyers in the private practice of law may misrepresent their
identity or purpose in investigating a matte r."
122  O n  t h e  
m e r i t s ,  t h e  
c o u r t
found that Gatti had affirmatively misrepresented his identity to the med-
ical agency.
123 
G a t t i  
f u r t
h e r  
l i

























formed independent medical examinations, which he [did] not do, and
that he was interested in working for CMR, when in fact he was n o t . "
I2 4 During the proceedings on appeal, the U.S. Attorney for the District
o f Oregon filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Oregon Supreme Court
to carve out an exception permitting the use o f  deception in undercover
law enforcement operations that "involve both civil and criminal cases,
ranging from enforcement of civil rights statutes to international narcot-
ics conspiracies."
125 
V a r i o u s  
c i v i l  
r i g h
t s  
o r g a
n i z a t
i o n s  
r e q
u e s




right to use deception in undercover investigations o f  housing discrimi-
na t ion .
126  
T h u








































the court to create two status-based exceptions.
The court rejected these arguments and broadly held that deception
of any type was prohibited by the literal language o f  the code: "Faithful
dherence to the wording o f  DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), ORS
9.527(4), and this court's case law does not permit recognition of an ex-
ception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepre-
sentation, or false statements."
127 T h e  
C o d e ' s  
p r o s c r i p t i o
n s  
o n  




misrepresentations "apply to a ll members o f  the Bar, without excep-
io n . "


















































Oregon honesty rule. Gatt i was reprimanded. B u t  that was not the end
of the story.
E. The Oregon Response to Gatti
Following the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Gatti, which re-
jected the Justice Department's request for an express carve-out for crim-
121. id. at 979-80.
122. id at 972.
123. Id at 974.
124. Id
125. Id at 974-75.
126. Id at 975; see also Jesse W. Barton, A Remedy for Gatti, OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN 70
(November 2001), available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulleti&Olnoviparting•htm (refer-
encing proposed bill to permit undercover investigations by civil rights agencies and law enforce-
ment agencies).
127. Gatti, 8 P.3d at 976.
128. Id.
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inal law enforcement, ongoing undercover criminal investigations in the
state ground to a halt .
129 S e v e r a l  
f e d e r a l  
c r i m i
n a l  
i n v e s t
i g a t i o
n s  
w e
r e
halted midway.'" The Justice Department filed suit to enjoin the Oregon
Bar from nforcing DR 1-102 against federal prosecutors involved in
criminal undercover operations.
131 As the suit was pending, the Oregon State Bar—a unified bar in
which membership is mandatory for all Oregon lawyers—scrambled to
revise its ethics code.
132 T h e  
l a w  
e n f o r c e
m e n t  
c o m m
u n i t y  
p r o
p o s
e d  
a
n
amendment to the rules, which would exempt government lawyers from
the ban on deceit and misrepresentation.
133 N t  t o  b e  
l e f t  o u t ,  
c i v i l  
r i g h t s
lawyers proposed expanding the exemption to lawyers for  "publicly
funded civil rights enforcement agencies, including nonprofit organiza-
tions such as legal services offices."
134 T h e  
O r e g o n  
B a r  
r e j e c t e d  
t h e s e
carve-outs.
In 2002, Oregon amended its ethics rules to permit the use of indi-
rect deception in undercover operations by all lawyers, regardless of sta-
tus of the lawyer or nature of the c laim.
135 A s  a m e n d e d ,  
t h e  
O r e g o n  
e t h -
ics rules provide that a lawyer may not "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's fitness to practice /aw."
136 T h e  
i t a l i c i z e d  
p o r t i o n s  
w e r e  
a d d -129. Moore, supra note 26, at 964.130. See id
131. Oregon State Bar, 2001 House of Delegates Meeting: Agenda 9  (September 22, 2001),
available at http://www.osbar.orgileadership/hod/2001/901agenda.htm. The Justice Department suit
sought a declaratory judgment that "the Supremacy Clause bars any application to federal attorneys
of DR 1-102 and DR 7-102" of  the Oregon Ethics Code, as interpreted by the Oregon Supreme
Cour t  in G at t i.  I d ;  OREGON STATE BAR,  BAR LEADER COMMUNICATOR,  June 7,  2001,  at  1,  av ai l-
able at http://www.osbar.orgl_docs/blc/blc_OlJune7.pdf (Oregon State Bar voting to defend itself
against federal suit).
132. Barton, supra note 126.
133.M
134. Id
135. In January 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court approved an amendment to DR 1-102, to
provide that "it shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or
to supervise lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or consti-
tutional rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with these rules." OR.
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (2003); Sylvia E. Stevens, New (and Evolving) Devel-
opments in the Disciplinary Rules, OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN 27 (Apr. 2002); Arthur Garwin, Cov-
ert Work OK, I NO. 6 A.B.A. J. E
-
R E P O R T  9  
( 2 0 0 2 ) .  
O r e g o n  
s u b s e q u e
n t l y  
c h a n









vert to the ABA Model Rules format, and added language to its new rule 8.4(a)(3) banning only that
deception "that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." Oregon State Bar Ass'n
Bd. o f  Governors, Formal Op. 2005-173 (2005), available at http://www.osbar.orgi_docs/ eth-
ics/2005-173.pdf [hereinafter Or. Ethics Op.].
136. OR. RULES OF PROF1 CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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ed in 2002, subsequent to the Oregon court's decision in Gatt i.
137 T h enew Oregon rule explicitly provides that lawyers may ethically supervise
undercover investigations in which they themselves do not directly par-
ticipate:
[IT shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise cli-
ents or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the in-
vestigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional
rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance
with these Rules of Professional Conduct. "Covert activity," as
used in this rule, means an effort to obtain information on unlawful
activity through the use of misrepresentations or other subterfuge. 138
The protection of the revised rule is available only "when the law-
yer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foresee-
able future."
I39 
T h u s ,  
i n  
r e s p























rule that permits the use of deception and "subterfuge" by lawyers, with-
out distinction between public and private sector lawyers. The lawyer
must have a good faith belief that there is a reasonable possibility of un-
lawful activity—without regard to the substantive subject matter of the
client's underlying claim. The investigation may be supervised by the
lawyer, who may not, however, directly participate in it.
The revised Oregon law, by its terms, clearly permits undercover
operations to investigate violations of criminal law, by either the prose-
cution or the defense.
14() I t  
w o u l d  
a l s o  
p e r m i
t  
s u b t e









civil law violation, or violation of civil rights, without specifying the li-
mitations on either. I t  is not clear how far the rule reaches. Would any
civil law violation justify deception in Oregon? The classic examples
would be testers for housing or employment discrimination, or in trade-
mark i fringement cases. What about the investigation of civil fraud?
For example, Daniel Gatti himself was purportedly involved in an inves-
tigation of fraud by a medical review agency.141 Would that investiga-
tion justify the use of deception under the new rule? Fraud is a violation
of civil and, in some circumstances, criminal law, and an investigation of
billing practices would seem to comply at least facially with the revised
rule. Indeed, any tort could be characterized as a violation of civil law.
137. January 2002 Special House of Delegates Meeting: Agenda (January 18, 2002), available
at http://www.osbar.org/leadership/hod/2002/agendaJan02.htm1 (detailing resolutions to be voted on
in upcoming meeting).
138. OR. RULES OF PROFT CONDUCT R. 8.4(b).
139. Id
140. See id
141. See In re Gatti, 8 1
3
. 3d 9 6 6 ,  
9 6 9  
( O r .  
2 0 0 0 )
.
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An ethics opinion by the Oregon State Bar Association clarified
some of these issues by the use of three hypotheticals.
142 I n  t h e  fi r s t  
h y -
pothetical scenario, the Oregon committee opined that a lawyer could not
advise a client to use subterfuge to investigate the denial of a worker's
compensation claim, because there was no unlawful activity or violation
of law.
143 











































defense lawyer in a personal injury case could not directly deceive the
physician for a purported malingerer who was suspected of exaggerating
or falsifying injur ies .
144 W h i l e  
i n  
t h i s  
i n s t a n
c e  
t h e









legal violation, the lawyer could not ethically participate directly in the
subterfuge, but was limited to advising the client and "supervising" the
investigation.
145 I n  
a  
t h i r d  
h y p o t
h e t i c



















pervise police officers in an undercover drug buy operation based upon
probable cause to believe that illegal drug activity was underway.146
Thus, the Oregon Bar illustrated that its new rule is limited to indirect
participation by lawyers in investigations where there is evidence of un-
lawful activity.
Oregon has eliminated status-based distinctions and created a
broad-based rule which permits indirect deception by lawyers to investi-
gate unlawful conduct, regardless of the substantive subject-matter of the
lient's underlying claim or defense. Other states, discussed infra in Part
V, hav  come up with a patchwork of status-based distinctions that con-
tain incremental measures, few o f  which provide much guidance for
practitioners, unless you happen to be a prosecutor or a CIA agent.
STATUS-BASED EXCEPTIONS IN SUBSTANTIVE SUBJECT AREAS
This Part will now examine three substantive areas of the law in
which undercover investigators are frequently supervised by lawyers:
criminal law, intellectual property, and civil rights. These are substan-
tive areas in which some degree of deception is often considered neces-
sary in order to investigate and prosecute affirmative claims for violation
of the law.
142. See Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135. This is a revision of Oregon Ethics Opinion 2003-
173, which was decided under the prior Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility. Compare id.
with Oregon State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-173 (2003).
143. Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135.
144. Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135, at 3-4.
145. Id. at 4. This second hypothetical is actually very similar to the facts of In re Gatti itself,
and suggests that the same result would be obtained under the revised rules, due to the lawyer's
direct involvement in the deception.
146.M at 5-6.
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A. Criminal Law
The use of deception by government lawyers in undercover crimi-
nal investigations has been recognized by a number of authorities. Fred
C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green have observed that "prosecutors rou-
tinely direct law enforcement agents to mislead suspects about the
agents' identities and goa ls."
147 I n  A p p l e  
C o r p s  
L t d .  
v .  
I n t e r n a t
i o n a l  
C o l
-
lectors Society, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ac-
knowledged that "[u]ndereover agents in criminal cases and discrimina-
tion testers in civil cases, acting under the direction of lawyers, custom-
arily dissemble as to their identities or purposes to gather evidence of
wrongdoing." 48
The use of deception by law enforcement authorities has a long his-
tory. As  early as 1932, the United States Supreme Court, in its first case
recognizing the entrapment defense,
I49 n o t e d  t h a t  
" [ a ] r t i fi c e  
a n d  
s t r a t a -
gem may be mployed to c tch those engaged in criminal enterprises."
150Maurice Nadjari, a controversial former New York State Special Prose-
cutor, explained: "When you're involved with drug sellers, you have to
go out and buy drugs. When judges are selling fixes, you have to go out
and buy the fix. That is the only way to do it." 51
As Robert Blecker has comprehensively described, the use of de-
ception by government agents posing as criminals has ranged from the
use of manufactured crimes in New York City in the 1970s, to the fa-
mous Abscam scandal in which government informants and agents, pos-
ing as Arab sheiks, bribed U.S. Congressmen in front of FBI video cam-
eras.152 In Abscam, federal agents set up and funded a dummy front cor-
poration called "Abdul Enterprises."
153 J u s t i c e  
D e p a r t m e n t  
l a w y e r s  
s u -
pervised and advised the undercover agents during the course of the sting
operation.
154 
S i x  
c o n g
r e s s





























147. Fred C. Zacharias 81 Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of  Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO.
L.J. 207, 231 (2000).
148. 15 F. Sum,. 2d 456, 475 (D.N.I. 1998).
149. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 443 (1932).
150. See id. at 441. In that case, the entrapment defense was recognized where an undercover
federal revenue agent repeatedly importuned the defendant to fetch him contraband liquor. T he
federal agent lured the suspect into committing the crime "by repeated and persistent solicitation in
which he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experi-
ences as companions in arms in the [first] World War." Id. at 441. This was a "gross abuse of au-
thority." I d
151. Marcia Chambers, Court Condemns Nadjari Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1974, at Al .
 152. Blecker, supra note 107, at 872-73. One U.S. Congressman was captured on tape brag-
ging that, "1 have larceny in my blood." Id. at 887.
153. See id. at 873.
154. See id. at 882, 956. D a l  lawyers even advised government informants and agents as to
the amount of bribes to offer. I d
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Camden, New Jersey, and various Philadelphia city councilmen were
convicted of bribery.
I55 T h e  
i n d i c t e d  
c o n g r e
s s m e n  
a r g
u e d  
e n t r
a p m e
n t ;
their constitutional due process rights were allegedly violated because
they were unwittingly pressured by government agents into committing
crimes that they were not previously disposed to commit.
I56 S o m e  c o u r t swere troubled by the cond ct of  the government agents—one federal
judge termed it " ou t r ageous "
157
—but  a l l  
c o n v i c t i o n s  
w e r e  















































that reviewed the convictions; the courts held that federal agents may
lawfully "simulate the guarded conversation that would be expected of
those proposing an unlawful venture. They need not say, 'Congressman,
I have here a cash bribe to be exchanged for your corrupt promise to be
influenced in your official ac tion."
I59 In Operation Greylord, dozens of FBI agents—all of whom were
lawyers—posed as state prosecutors and defense attorneys in an under-
cover sting operation which netted over 60 bribery convictions of corrupt
judges and lawyers.
16° T h e  
F B I  














crimes that were used as bait to lure corrupt lawyers and judges.
I61 S i g -nificantly, the federal agents consummated their scams by giving false
155. See id; United.States. v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983); United.States. v. Myers,
692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Wikipedia Entry on Abscam, http://en.wikipedia.orgiwikii
Abscam (last visited August 3, 2008).
156. See United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Even those trial courts which initially dismissed Abscam indictments on grounds of
government overreaching agreed in principle with the permissibility of undercover investigations
under proper circumstances. For  example, in Kelly, the trial judge, while dismissing the charges
against Congressman Kelly, due to "outrageous" government conduct, acknowledged that "carefully
devised and supervised covert investigations often are the only means of discovering breaches of the
fundamental mandate of one's office." 539 F. Supp. at 371.
157. id at 373.
158. See Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460; Williams, 705 F l d 603; Myers, 692 F.2d 823; United States v.
Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982); see
also Blecker, supra note 107, at 964.
159. Myers, 692 F.2d at 844.
160. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S COMP-
LIANCE WITH ME ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES (REDACTED), ch. 4 (Septem-
ber 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.govioigispecia1/0509/chapter4.htm.
161. As described by the Justice Department Office of the Inspector General:
FBI agents who were licensed attorneys assumed roles as county prosecutors and private
practitioners. In addition, the FBI recruited a state prosecutor and a judge from southern
Illinois who were temporally assigned to Cook County to deal with the backlog of cases
there. Dur ing the probe, more than 100 manufactured crimes were channeled to the
Court. Equipped with electronic surveillance devices, the undercover agents were able to
record hundreds of incriminating conversations with judges and attorneys which revealed
that judges routinely accepted bribes to dismiss cases and received kickbacks from attor-
neys for assigning cases to them.
Id
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testimony about their fabricated cases.
162 T h e  c o u r t  
o f  
a p p e a l s ,  
i n  
a f fi r m -
ing the conviction of a corrupt judge, upheld the government's use of lies
and deception.
I63 Perjury is a crime, and Murphy tells us that those who commit
crimes themselves cannot prosecute others' crimes. B u t  criminal
proceedings are not designed to  establish the relative equities
among police and defendants. In  many categories of cases it is nec-
essary for the agents to commit acts that, standing by themselves,
a r e  criminal.'Thus, tefderal court in Operation Greylord—unlike the courts in Ma-
lone and Friedman—upheld the use of perjury to prosecute corruption in
the legal system.
While, as is evident from the foregoing examples, government law-
yers frequently supervise undercover investigations, i t  is  less clear
whether such conduct complies with the literal language of Model Rule
8.4. The focus of the courts generally has been on the overall legality of
the government conduct and the applicability of the entrapment defense,
not on the ethics of individual government attomeys.
165 T h e  e t h i c a l  
i s -
sues raised by lawyer involvement in undercover surveillance are further
highlighted by the McDade Amendment, which commands federal pros-
ecutors to comply with state ethics rules .
166 N o w ,  
g o v e r n m e n t  
l a w y e r s
engaged in nationwide investigations must comply with the ethics rules
of each individual jurisdiction in which they operate, and in which they
are licensee
° 
F u r t h e
r m o r e ,  
m o
s t  
s t
a t
e s  
f o
l l


















explicitly forbidding lawyer conduct based on dishonesty, deceit or mis-
162. See United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,1528 (7th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 1541. The conduct upheld by the federal courts in Operation Greylord is similar to
the subornation of perjury which resulted in a public sanction for a state prosecutor in In re Fried-
man. In both instances, a prosecutor instructed a law enforcement agent to lie under oath in order to
consummate a bribery prosecution.
164. Id. at 1528.
165. See id.
166. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, § 801 (1998) (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000)). See Zacharias &
Green, supra note 147, at 231. Zachiarias and Green criticize the McDade Amendment, which sub-
jects federal prosecutors to state ethics regulations, for, among other things, subjecting federal prose-
cutors to a patchwork of potentially inconsistent state regulations. Id. These state ethics rules are
not designed for federal prosecutors, who are generally held to a higher standard than state practitio-
ners, and state rules could impose unnecessary burdens on federal law enforcement, which is already
regulated by the federal courts and executive branch. See id.
167. This imposes an enormous responsibility on those attorneys who conduct an investigation
in numerous jurisdictions. For  example, the Abscam investigation involved conduct in many juris-
dictions, including the incorporation of  "Abdul Enterprises" in New York, meetings on a Florida
yacht, meetings in Washington D.C., Virginia and New Jersey. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F i d
1460,1462-67 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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representation.
I68 A s  
a  
r e s u l t
,  




m e n t
















rent rule  of  professional conduct fail to recognize the expanded role
played by the government attorney in the investigation of federal crimes
and do not provide sufficient guidance for the government attomey's
behavior."
169 
T h e  
M c D



























the various approaches to the problem of deception in undercover inves-
tigations, complicates the lives of federal prosecutors.
A federal district court has analyzed the ethical issues raised in at-
torney supervision of undercover investigations. United States v. Parker
arose from an undercover investigation of police officers for corruption
and civil rights violations.
1713 T h e  
F B I  
s e t  
u p  
a n  
u n d e r c
o v e r  
s t i
n g  
o p e
r a -
tion, targeting the local police, in which federal agents and informants
posing as drug dealers were extorted and robbed by the local police offi-
cers.171 The defendant police officers claimed that the investigating at-
torneys improperly employed deception, dishonesty and misrepresenta-
tion in violation of DR 1-102 of New York's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. In I n  response, the district court advanced the questionable
proposition that the Code's proscription on attorney deception did not
apply to prosecutors: "Indeed, opinions of state and local bar associations
hold DR 1-102(A)(4) does not apply to prosecuting attorneys who pro-
vide supervision and advice to undercover investigations."
173 T h e  d i s t r i c tcourt roundly rejected the challenge to undercover operations supervised
by federal prosecutors:
Defendants' logic would, i f  accepted, mean that government attor-
neys could not supervise investigations involving undercover agents
168. See discussion infra Part V.
169. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-
Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923,925-26 (1996).
170.165 F. Supp. 2d 431,476 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
171.M at 440.
172. They also argued that they were entrapped by government agents. See id. at 476.
173. Id (citations omitted). This aspect of the court's decision is actually mistaken, as it mis-
reads two New York Ethics Opinions concerning the permissibility of surreptitious tape recording,
neither of which carves out an explicit exception for prosecutors. See N.Y. City Law Ass'n, Formal
Ethics Op. 696 (1993) (permitting surreptitious taping regardless of attorney status); N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, Formal Ethics op. 515 (1979), available at http://www.nysba.org/AMiTemplate.cfm?Sec-
tion=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=50598cTEMPLATE—/CMJContentDisplay.cfm (holding that
lawyer in criminal case, regardless of whether government or private, may secretly record telephone
conversation with consent of one side). Thus, the court simply misread two local bar association
ethics opinions. In addition, the district court overlooked the (admittedly confusing) decision of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), which
held that federal prosecutors must comply with the non-contact rule of New York Lawyer's Code
DR 7-104. See Hammad, 858 F.2d 834. I f  the no contact rule does apply to undercover federal
investigations, albeit honored in the breach, it would seem logical for the ban on deception in New
York Lawyer's Code DR 1-102 to apply as well.
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and informants who cannot reveal their true identity and purpose to
the targets of the investigation without thereby rendering the inves-
tigation futile and dangerous. There is no authority for such a con-
clusion.
I74Thus, the district court held that government lawyers may ethically su-
pervise undercover investigations involving deception.
175 Even state ethics prosecutors have been known to resort to decep-
tion and trickery in their own investigations of attorney misconduct. The
Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (OLPR)—the
Minnesota lawyer police—has, in the past, dispatched investigators to
see if  suspended or disbarred lawyers will take illic it bait in the form of
prospective inquiring c lients .
176 A c c o r d i n g  
t o  
W i l l i a m  
W e r n t
z ,  
f o r m
e r
chief counsel t  the Min esota OLPR, a government investigator would
teleph ne suspended or disbarred lawyers to inquire whether they were
still practicing.
I77 
W h i l e  






















who used her actual name, she nonetheless would not identify herself as
a representative of the bar counse1.
178 A n  
i l l u s t r a t i v e  
e x a m p l e  
o f  
t h e  
i n -
vestigator's phone call would be something like this: "Hello, I'm Lynda
Olson and I'm wondering whether Mr. Doe is available for representa-
tion in a family law matter."
I79 I n  t h e  
e v e n t  
t h a t  
t h e  
u n s u s p e
c t i n g  
t a r g
e t
took the bait and accepted the ersatz client, the suspended attorney would
be pros cuted for unauthorized practice of law or contempt of court.
180 At this time, particularly in light of the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision in Pautler,
181 t h e r e  
i s  
n o  
d e fi n i t i
v e  
n a t i
o n a l  
s o l
u t i









tion of wh ther a government lawyer may ethically supervise a deceptive
174. United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431,476-77 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
175. The court alternatively held that even i f the prosecutors' conduct were to violate the Code,
exclusion of the evidence is not required. See id
176. See William Wemz, 'Pretexting,' Prevaricating and Getting the Facts, MINN. LAW., Oct.
30,2006, available at http://www.minnlawyer.comiarticle.cfm?recid=74661.
177. Id William Wemz left OLPR in approximately 1992. Id. at I.
178. See id.
179. See id According to Mr. Wemz, a former chief counsel to the Minnesota Office of Law-
yers Professional Responsibility, the investigator would never actually lie to the lawyer, i.e., by
assuming a fake identity or falsely pretending to be a client. She would rather say, truthfully, that
she was "interested in finding Out whether" the ineligible lawyer was willing to accept a new case—
a literally true proposition. The OLPR would allow the target of the sting to assume that the reason
that the caller is "interested" is because of  a desire for  legal services—not a desire to prosecute.
Telephone Interview with William Wemz, Former Chief Counsel, Minn. Office of Law. Prof 1 Re-
sponsibility (October 10,2007). Lynda Olson is not the name of an OLPR investigator.
180. The Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility advises that the procedures
described in the Wemz article are not consistent with current OLPR practice or policy. E-mail from
Minn. Office of  Law. Prof'  I Responsibility to Barry R. Temkin, Adjunct Professor of Law, New
York Law School (2008) (on file with author).
181. See discussion supra Part
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investigation. Mos t state bars to have considered this issue—with the
notable exception of O r e g o n
1 8 2
— h a v e  c a r v e d  
o u t  
a n  
e x c e p t i o
n  
f o r  
p r o s
e -
cutors who supervise undercover criminal investigations.
183
B. Testers in Civil Rights Cases
Plaintiffs' c iv il rights lawyers have long used testers in order to
build discrimination cases against employers or landlords, often supply-
ing their testers with "elaborately falsified credentials."
184 T e s t e r s  h a v etraditionally be n di patc ed to gather evidence of racial steering and
other discriminatory practices by which employers, landlords, sellers, or
real estate agents falsely tell minority applicants that there are no vacan-
cies or "steer" them to segregated housing.
I85 A s  t h e  
S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  
h a s
explained, "testers' are individuals who, without an intent to rent or pur-
chase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose
of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices."
186 T h e  u s e  o f  
u n -
dercover test rs in discrimination cases has been approved by the courts:
This court and others have repeatedly approved and sanctioned the
role of 'testers' in racial discrimination cases. I t  is frequently diffi-
cult to develop proof in discrimination cases and the evidence pro-
vided by testers is frequently valuable, i f  not indispensable.
[A]e have long recognized that this requirement of deception was a
relatively small price to pay to defeat racial discrimination.'"
Most authorities have agreed that the use of deception by testers is "a
reasonable way—in fact, a necessary way—to carry the burden of prov-
ing discrimination."
I88 T h e  
g o a l  
o f  
fi g h t i n
g  
r a c i
a l  
d i s c r
i m i n a






mirable. But does the lofty goal justify the use of deception by attorneys
who guide and supervise testers?
Although several authorities acknowledge the prevalence of  and
need for discrimination testers,
I89 f e w e r  
a u t h o r i t i e s  
s p e c i fi c a l
l y  
c o n s i
d e r
182. See discussion supra Part
183. As discussed infra Part V, prosecutors may supervise undercover criminal investigations
in Utah, Oregon, and Florida.
184. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22, at 793.
185. See generally Havens Reality Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1981).
186. Id. at 373. The primary issue in Havens was whether black and white testers had standing
to sue a discriminating landlord under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The landlord steered black
testers to one apartment complex, and white testers to another. There was no discussion of the ethics
of the attorneys supervising the investigation.
187. Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983).
188. Freedman, supra note 65, at 780. Accord Apple Corps Ltd. v. Intl  Collectors Soc'y, 15
F. Supp. 2d 456 (DIU. 1998); Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
189. See Havens Really Corp., 455 U.S. at 373; Richardson, 712 F.2d at 321.
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the ethics of attorneys who supervise testers. As  mentioned above, Isbell
and Salvi articulated a rationale for approving the ethics of lawyers su-
pervising discrimination testers, arguing that "the scales of social policy
tip markedly in favor of the use of undercover investigators and dis-
crimination testers, despite the deceptions necessarily entailed."
90 T h eban on dec ption in Model Rule 8.4 should be narrowly limited to those
misrepresentations that "would be considered of such gravity as to raise
questions as to a person's fitness to be a lawyer."
191 W i t h o u t  d e fi n i n g  
t h e
outer boundaries of such conduct, Isbell a d Salvi argue that the use of
discrimination testers, solely to gather evidence, does not violate Rule
8.4.
There is a dearth of judicial authority on the ethics of lawyers who
supervise testers. One trial court recently considered the surreptitious
tape recording of unsuspecting adversaries in a discrimination case and
held that the surreptitious tape recording, and subsequent press release,
of discriminatory evidence was ethically justified both by the societal
interest in combating discrimination and by the need for the deception in
order to capture otherwise fleeing evidence.
192 I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
s e v e r a l  
s t a t e
ethics committees have approved the practice in discrimination cases.
193The issue has not, however, been squarely addressed by the courts.
C. Intellectual Property Cases
Undercover investigations are often used in trademark and unfair
competition cases.'" A  primary rationale behind the intellectual prop-
erty exception is that deception is often the only way to police counter-
190. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22, at 804. This influential article opened the door for many
courts and bar associations to approve testers in discrimination cases. However, some of Isbell and
Salves arguments have proved to be strained, including the claim that a lawyer posing as an investi-
gator is not acting "in the course of representing a client" within the meaning of Model Rule 4.1. Id.
at 816-17. While it may or may not be correct, it misses the point, since most sting operations in-
volve undercover investigators supervised by lawyers. As a matter of common sense, the civil rights
lawyer who tells a tester to assume a fake identity is doing so on behalf of a client, in the lawyer's
representational capacity. Moreover, the test of whether a lawyer acts in a representative capacity
depends on a number of factors, including an agreement with the client to provide legal services, a
retainer agreement, fee arrangement, past relationships with the client, etc. See Barry R. Temkin, Is
There a Tort of Negligent Referral?, 17 TOURO L. REV. 639 (2001). In any event the whole point of
Isbell and Salvi's article is to create a rationale for lawyers, acting in their representative capacity,
who supervise investigators. Thus the argument that Model Rule 4.1 does not apply to lawyers qua
investigators does not advance the overall argument.
191. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22, at 817.
192. See Mena v. Key Food Stores Co-Operative, 758 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
2003).
193. See New York County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Prof'  1 Ethics, Formal Op. No. 737
(2007), available at http://www.nycla.orgiethicsopinions. [hereinafter N.Y. County Ethics Op. 737J.
194. See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Inel Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998).
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feiting and trademark infringement.
195 A  l a w y e r  
o r  
i n v e s t i g a t o
r  
w h o
openly identifies herself as an agent of the trademark owner is unlikely to
uncover evidence of infringing conduct. In addition, the courts have dis-
cussed the public policy of protecting intellectual property rights.
The Beatles, Paul McCartney, Yoko Ono, and the estate of the late
John Lennon served as the background for an examination of the ethics
of investigative techniques in Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collec-
tors Society.
196 
A p p l e  
C o r
p s  
a g r
e e d  
w i


















tors Society (ICS) to limit distribution of commemorative postage stamps
featuring images of  the Beatles to members of  a specific fan c lub.
I97Suspecting non-compliance with their agreement, counsel for the plain-
t if f  telephoned ICS's public, toll-free telephone number and inquired as
to the availability of the stamps.
198 T h e  
l a w y e r  
d i d  
n o t  
i d e n t i f y  
h e r s e
l f  
a s




































































































including a legal secretary, investigators, and an attomey's husband—
telephoned the defendants and ordered stamps that should have been
available only to fan club members under the consent agreement.
20
'
The district court found that the sale of  Beatles stamps to non-
members violated the consent decree and further found that the conduct
of the plaintiff's counsel did not violate ethical restrictions on contact
with represented parties under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct
(RPC) 4.2 or the proscription on deceit under Rule 8.4(c).202 Rather, the
court held that "RPC 4.2 cannot apply where lawyers and/or their inves-
tigators, seeking to learn about current corporate misconduct, act as
members of the general public to engage in ordinary business transac-
tions with low-level employees of a represented corporation."
203 The court similarly found that Apple's attorneys did not engage in
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit or  misrepresentation" because New Jersey
Rule 8.4 "does not apply to misrepresentations solely as to identity or
195. See, e.g., Gidatex v. Camapniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119,124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that i t is difficult i f  not impossible to prove "palming off'  theory without resort to decep-
tion).
196.15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998).
197. Id. at 468.
198. Id at 462.
199. Id. at 462. The attorney practiced under her married name.
200. See id
201. See id at 462-63.
202. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. Inel Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456,473-77 (D.N.J. 1998).
203. See id at 474-75.
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purpose and solely for evidence-gathering purposes."
204 R e l y i n g  i n  
p a r t
on the declaration of plaintiffs' expert witness, Professor Bruce Green,
the court observed that "[t]he prevailing understanding in the legal pro-
fession is that a public or private lawyer's use of an undercover investi-
gator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed,
especially where it would be difficult to discover the violations by other
means."
205 
T h e  
d e c
e p t
































misconduct that would not only be generally reproved if  committed by
anyon , whether lawyer or nonlawyer, but would be considered of such
gravity as to raise questions as to a person's fitness to be a lawyer."
206Testers and investigators, on the other hand, do not engage in grave dis-
honesty but instead "do no more than conceal their identity or purpose to
the extent necessary to gather evidence."
207 T h u s  
d e c e p t i o n ,  
w h e n  
l i m -
ited to purpose and identity, is not unethical when necessary to investi-
gat  ongoing unlawful conduct. Other intellectual property cases have
similarly held that undercover deception is ethically permissible.
2
"
While some lower courts have carved out limited exceptions to the
lawyer honesty rule, not all authorities are in agreement, as we will see
infra in Part V. Some jurisdictions have sought to carve out exceptions
permitting deception by law enforcement officers acting in their capacity
as such, while other jurisdictions have attempted to adopt the Isbell and
Salvi gloss on Rule 8.4, which narrows the rule to proscribe only decep-
tive conduct that reflects adversely on an attomey's fitness to practice
law.
V. STATE ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICT BY
STATUS-BASED DISTINCTIONS
As discussed, the tension between the literal language of the ABA
Model Rules and the need for undercover investigations, particularly in
criminal cases, has not been susceptible to easy resolution. As  we have
seen, the Oregon response to In re Gatti was to amend the state's ethics
rules to permit lawyers, regardless o f  their public/private status and
without respect to the subject matter of the underlying claim, to indi-
rectly supervise and counsel clients about deceptive undercover investi-
204. Id at 475.
205. M
206. Id. at 476 (quoting Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22, at 817).
207. Id
208. See, e.g., Gidatex v. Camapniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1
("The presence o f  investigators posing as interior decorators did not cause
any statements they otherwise would not have made. There is no evidence
clerks were tricked or duped by the investigators' simple questions such as
or 'so there is no place to get their furniture?'").
19, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
the sales clerks to make
to indicate that the sales
is the quality the same?'
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gations!'" Oregon has in effect eliminated status-based distinctions. But
no other state has been prepared to go that far. The results, as discussed
below, have been strained and inconsistent.
A. The Florida Approach.. Status-Based Exception
The Florida Rules o f  Professional Conduct explicitly exempt law
enforcement officers and prosecutors f rom the general ban on decep-
tion.210 The  2006 amendment
211 t o  t h e  
F l o r i d a  
r u l e s  
p r o v i d
e  





[E]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation, except that it shall not be professional misconduct for a
lawyerfor a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency
to advise others about or to supervise another in an undercover in-
vestigation, unless prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be pro-
fessional misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity other than
as a lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory
agency to participate in an undercover investigation, unless prohib-
ited by law or ru le!"
Thus, prosecutors may supervise or give advice about an undercover in-
vestigation!" The rule is ambiguously written, but seems to suggest that
a government lawyer employed in a non-representational capacity may
participate in an undercover investigation!"
The commentary to the Florida rule does little to explain its ration-
ale but does appear to reiterate that only government lawyers may super-
vise undercover investigations: "Subdivision (c) recognizes instances
where lawyers in criminal law enforcement agencies or regulatory agen-
cies advise others about or supervise others in undercover investigations,
209. Oregon's amended rule 8.4, as discussed infra, states that covert activity is permitted only
where there is a reasonable basis for the attorney to believe that unlawful conduct is afoot. OR.
RULES OF Pi ton, CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008).
210. See FLA. RULES OF PROE'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2008).
211. See sunEthics.com, Florida New Archive — Lawyer Ethics, Rules and Opinions, http://sun
ethics.comile-rulesops.htm (last visited August 3, 2008).
212. FLA. RULES OF PROE'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (emphasis added).
213. The commentary to the Florida Rule suggests that only government lawyers may super-
vise undercover investigations. See FLA. RULES OF PROWL CONDUCT R. 4
-
8 . 4  c m t .
214. Florida Rule 4-8.4(c) as written could mean one of two things. It could mean that "a law-
yer employed b y  a criminal law enforcement agency" in a capacity "other than a lawyer" may
directly participate in an undercover sting. I.e., an FBI agent who happens to be a lawyer may ethi-
cally serve as an undercover agent. The other interpretation is to permit deception by any lawyer
"employed in a capacity other than as a lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory
agency"—i.e., any lawyer in private practice may directly participate in an undercover sting. Given
the context and the interpretation of similar rules in other states, including Virginia, the former inter-
pretation makes more sense. I t  would seem anomalous to accord more leeway in Florida to lawyers
in private practice than to government prosecutors.
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and provides an exception to allow the activity without the lawyer engag-
ing in professional misconduct. The exception acknowledges current,
acceptable practice of these agencies."
215
B. Utah State Bar: Prosecutors May Supervise
Undercover Investigations
Utah has attempted to carve out a status-based exception for gov-
ernment attorneys who supervise undercover criminal investigations.
Unlike Florida, however, Utah has done so by an ethics opinion rather
than formal rule change.
2I6 T h e  
U t a h  
B a r  












ception is n cessary for law enforcement agents to infiltrate sophisticated
crimin l enterprises!" Although there is some deception involved in
running an undercover law-enforcement sting operation, Utah Ethics
Rule 8.4 was not intended to "prohibit prosecutors or other government
lawyers from participating in lawful undercover investigations."
218 R a -ther, the Utah ethics rule "was intended to make subject to professional
discipline only illegal conduct by a lawyer that brings into question the
lawyer's fitness to practice law. I t  was not intended to prevent state or
federal prosecutors or other government lawyers from taking part in law-
ful, undercover investigations."
2
" T h u s ,  
U t a h  
h a s  
c h o s e n  
t o  
i n t e r p r
e t  
i t s
ethics rules to imply a status-based law enforcement exception permit-
ting prosecutors—and no one else—to supervise deceptive investiga-
tions.
C. District of Columbia: The CIA Agent Opinion
The District of Columbia Bar Association considered misrepresen-
tations as to identity by federal agents and intelligence operatives who
happen t o  be licensed as  attorneys, but who l ie  i n  their  non-
representational capacities.
22° T h e  
D . C .  
B a r  
A s s o c i a t
i o n  
o p i n i
o n  
c o
n -
cluded that FBI agents and CIA operatives who lie in their field jobs, and
who are not engaged in the practice of law, do not violate D.C. Rule
215. FLA. RULES OF PROF1 CONDUCT R. 4-8.4 cmt.; sunEthics.com, Florida New Archive —
Lawyer Ethics, Rules and Opinions, http://sunethics.comile-rulesops.htm (last visited August 3,
2008).
216. See Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Formal op. 02-05 (2002), available at
http://www.utalthar.orgimles_ops_polsiethics_opinionsiop_02_05.htmltifl 8 [hereinafter Utah Ethics
OP-1
217. Id at 1-2 (quoting Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the
Department oPustice, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1982)). •
218. Utah Ethics Op., supra note 216, 119.
219.M 1110.
220. See Dist. of Columbia Bar, Formal Op. 323, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.
orgifor lawyersiethicsilegal_ethicsiopinionsiopinion323.cfm [hereinafter D.C. Ethics Op.].
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8.4.221 The D.C. ethics committee reasoned that the rule's proscription
on "fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" does not apply to all lying.222
Rather, the language applies "only to conduct that calls into question a
lawyer's suitability to practice laW."
223 C o v e r t  
s u r v e i l l a n c e  
w o r k  
i s  
d a n -
gerous. A s  th  committee explained, "[s]ome activities conducted on
behalf of th  United States necessarily involve circumstances where dis-
closure of  one's identity or purpose would be inappropriate—and, in-
deed, potentially dangerous."
224 A s  t h e  
D . C .  
e t h i c s  
c o m m i t
t e e  
w r o t
e :
"An attomey's professional competence and ability are not called into
question by service in our intelligence or national security agencies in
conformance with legal authorization, nor is it called into question by the
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employee from use of a concealed identity.226 This opinion does not, by
its terms, apply to U.S. attorneys or other government lawyers who rep-
resent clients—including the government—in court. Similar ly , it  does
not, by its terms, seem to apply to state or local undercover agents.
D. Virginia: Adopting the Isbell and Salvi Gloss
Recognizing the tension between the literal language of its version
of Rule 8.4, and the actual practice on the ground by federal law en-
forcement agencies, the Virginia State Bar Association recommended an
amendment to the 11.11e.
227 A s  
a m e n d e d ,  





( c )  
c u r r
e n t l
y
provides that "it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to e n g a g e  in
conduct involving ishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which
reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice /aW."
228 T h e  i t a l i -cized language was added in 2003, following Pautler and Gatti. Virginia
lawyers now are permitted to deceive as long as their deception does not
adversely reflect on their fitness to practice law. O n  its face, the
amended Virginia rule makes no status-based distinctions, as, for exam-
ple, between government and non-government lawyers.
However, a 2004 Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion took a status-based




224. Id at 3.
225. Id. at 2.
226. Id. at 2 (citing Apple Corps Ltd. v. Intl  Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (13.N.J.
1998)).
227. See Va. Continuing Legal Educ. Comm., Legal Ethics op. 1765 (2003), available at
http://www.vacle.orgiopinions/1765.htm [hereinafter Va. Ethics op. 1765].
228. See id (quoting VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.4(c)) (emphasis added).
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approving deception by law enforcement agents acting as field agents.
229The Virginia opinion does not explicitly consider the case of government
lawyers—such as assistant United States attorneys—acting in their "rep-
resentational capacities" on behalf of clients. According to the Virginia
ethics committee:
[W]hen an attorney employed by the federal government uses law-
ful methods, such as the use of "alias identities" and non-consensual
tape-recording, as part of his intelligence or covert activities, those
methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his fitness to
practice law; therefore, such conduct will not violate the prohibition
in Rule 8 .4(c).
2
"Left for another day are the questions o f  whether the new language per-mits the use o f  aliases by state prosecutors, by federal prosecutors who
supervise investigations, by defense counsel, by civil practitioners, and
so on.
E. The Iowa Approach: Finesse with a Comment
Yet another approach is illustrated by Iowa, in  which the relevant
ethics rule closely tracks A B A  Model Rule 8.4 in  broadly proscribing
deceit, fraud and misrepresentation, yet addresses the problem of under-
cover investigations by means o f  a comment.
23I A c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  
I o w a
commentary:
It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or
others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity
in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitu-
tional rights or in lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided
the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with these rules.
"Covert activity" means an effort to obtain information on unlawful
activity through the use o f misrepresentations or other subterfuge.
Covert activity may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer
as an advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith be-
lieves there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has
taken place, is taking place, or will take place in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Likewise, a government lawyer who supervises or participates
in a lawful covert operation which involves misrepresentation or
deceit for the purpose of gathering relevant information, such as law
229. See Va. Ethics op. 1756, supra note 227.
230. See id
231. See IOWA RULES OF PRoCL CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 6 (2008).
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enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or an intelli-
gence-gathering activity, does not, without more, violate this ru le .
232According to Professor Gregory Sisk, the Iowa comment was
passed by the state supreme court in the wake of the Gatti ruling in Ore-
gon and the Apple Corps ruling in  New Jersey, in  order to ensure that
legitimate undercover investigations could be pursued by law enforce-
ment agents and by private attorneys investigating violations o f  Ift.W.
233The Iowa exception follows the amendments to the Oregon code and ap-
plies to investigations of violations of civil law and constitutional rights,
as well as to criminal law.
234 N o t e  
t h a t  
t h e  
I o w a  
r u l e ,  
u n l i
k e  
F l o r
i d a ,  
i
s
not limited to law enforcement officers.
F. A Mixed Status and Conduct Based Approach:
New York County Lawyers Association
In 2007, th  New York County Lawyers' Association Professional
Ethics Committee (the "NYCLA committee") issued NYCLA Opinion
737, which analyzed the deception issue in terms of both status and eon-
d u ct .
2 3 5  

















































tion, fraud and misrepresentation are never permitted; rather lawyers
may, in  certain circumstances, engage in  "dissemblance," wh ich  the
committee limited to  "misstatements as to identity and purpose made
solely for gathering evidence."
236 T h e  
o p i n i o n  
f u r t h e r  
l i m i t e d  
i t s  
s c o p
e  
t o
civil matters only, and did not opine on criminal cases, although it  ap-
provingly cited United States v. Parker, which permits deception in un-
dercover investigations supervised b y  federal prosecutors.
237 T h eNYCLA committee concluded that, in civil cases, dissemblance, limited
o identity and purpose, is ethically permissible where:
(i) either (a) the investigation is of a violation of civil rights or intel-
lectual property rights and the lawyer believes in good faith that
such violation is taking place or will take place imminently or (b)
the dissemblance is expressly authorized by law; and
232. M
233. 16 IOWA PRACTICE SERIES § 12:4(a) (2008).
234. See IOWA RULES OF PROF1 CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 6; 16 IOWA PRACTICE SERIES §
12:4(e).
235. N.Y. County Ethics op. 737, supra note 193. The author is Chair of the New York Coun-
ty Lawyers Association Professional Ethics Committee ("NYCLA") and participated in the drafting
of NYCLA Ethics Opinion No. 737.
236. Id at 2. Black' s Law Dictionary defines "dissemble" as: "To give a false impression
about (something); to cover up (something) by deception . "  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506
(8th ed. 2004). Thus, the defmition of dissemblance contains an element of deception.
237. See United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 478 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
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(ii) the evidence sought is not reasonably available through other
lawful means; and
(iii) the lawyer's conduct and the investigators' conduct that the
lawyer is supervising do not otherwise violate the Code..
2 3 8Thus, the NYCLA opinion limits its reach to misrepresentions of identity
and purpose in two areas of the law: intellectual property and civil rights.
The deception must be narrow and is not permissible where there are
alternative means (such as discovery) to obtain the same information.
239Nevertheless, the NYCLA approach, as explained below, maintains sta-
tus-based distinctions and should thereby not serve as a template for a
nationwide solution to the lawyer honesty problem. Moreover, the
NYCLA opinion sidesteps the entire criminal prosecution issue.
240 In sum, Oregon and Virginia have explicitly modified their ethics
rules to permit deception that does not adversely reflect upon the law-
yer's fitness to practice laW.
241 O t h e r  
s t a t e s  
p e r m i t  
u n d e r c
o v e r  
i n v e s
t i g a -
tions supervised by government attorneys, either by explicit amendment
to the state ethics rules (Flor ida),
242 b y  j u d i c i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o
n  
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involvement in und rcover investigations, regardless of the underlying
subject matter, based on a comment to the ethics 1111e.
245
VI. STATUS-BASED DISTINCTIONS ARE Too SUBJECTIVE
AND VALUE-LADEN
A. Subject Matter and Conduct Axes
Analysis of the ethics of undercover investigations has historically
been driven by and followed societal values, especially in the instances
of discrimination testers and law enforcement. Permitting some dissem-
blance by investigators has served overall social goals, namely remedy-
ing racial discrimination and prosecuting crime. The relatively recent
growth of intellectual property testers in undercover investigations has
opened a panoply of possibilities. The question arises whether subter-
fuge should be permitted for additional subject areas o f  the law, or
238. Id. at 5-6.
239. Id. at
240. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.
241. See discussion supra Parts 111.E &  V.D.
242. See discussion supra Part V.A.
243. See United States v. Parker, 165 F. Stipp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
244. See discussion supra Part V.C.
245. See discussion supra Part V I .
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whether investigative deceit should be limited to the three subject areas
outlined above, e.g., criminal, trademark and civil rights. A  related ques-
tion is whether the validity of the lawyer's conduct depends on the iden-
tity of the client, e.g., whether government lawyers should be given more
leeway than private practitioners. Finally, we can ask whether the decep-
tion should b e  permitted only  b y  lawyers representing c laim-
ants/plaintiffs, or whether the doors should be opened to defense attor-
neys as well.
To answer these and related questions, the courts and commentators
have considered a number of factors, both explicitly and implicitly. O n
one hand, the courts and commentators have considered the nature of the
underlying case (e.g,. criminal or trademark), the status of the actor (pub-
lic or private), and the literal language of the Model Rules.
246 O t h e r  a u -thorities have focused on the nature of the attorney and investigator con-
duct (e.g., how egregious was the deception), the level of necessity for
the particular conduct, whether there was a violation of substantive ethics
rules, whether the attorney ratified the errant conduct of a rogue investi-
gator, etc .
247 
A n d ,  


































tion of different factors.
248 For the sake of this Article, these myriad factors can be analyzed
along two axes, status-based and conduct-based. The factors related to
the status-based axis pertain to both the subject matter of the case and the
status of the attorney. The conduct-based axis focuses on the conduct of
the attorney and investigator, as the attomey's agent. These factors in-
clude the following: the extent of the misrepresentation; whether the de-
ceit is direct or indirect; whether the deceit was necessary; whether alter-
native methods of obtaining the same evidence exist; and whether the
questioned conduct violates another ethics rule or principle of substan-
tive law, most notably the "no contact rule" of Model Rule 4.2. Courts
and commentators have often combined various factors in analyzing de-
ception cases?" I n  practice, conduct-axis factors have been driven by,
and followed from, subject-matter factors. We will next test the parame-
ters of the problem by use of a number of hypotheticals.
246. See, e.g., Parker, 165 F. Sup!). at 431 (criminal investigation); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Intl
Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (intellectual property case); D.C. Ethics Op.,
supra note 220 (federal intelligence or national security agent who is lawyer may use deceit in fur-
therance of "legitimate national security goals").
247. See N.Y. County Ethics Op. 737, supra note 193.
248. In re Pautler, 47 1
3
. 3d  1 1 7 5  
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249. See, e.g., N.Y. County Ethics Op. 737, supra note 193.
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B. The Slippery Slope Problem with Status-Based Distinctions:
Hypothetical Examples
The judicial opinions and scholarly articles on deception in investi-
gations tend to emphasize the importance of enforcing federal civil rights
laws, fighting housing discrimination, and enforcing trademark and cop-
yright laws .
293 
T h e  
q u e s
























should stop there, or whether, on the other hand, there are other emerging
areas of the law whose underlying values justify the use of deception. I t
may be difficult to engage in a ranking of values in order to determine
which societal values are so great as to necessitate or tolerate deception,
and which are not. Most of the commentators to weigh in on this topic
seem to broadly agree that rectifying centuries of racial prejudice justi-
fies the use of deception by testers.
251 B u t  w h a t  
a b o u t  
e n f o r c i n g  
t h e  
n a -
tion's intellectual property laws: Are these more important than protect-
ing life and limb? In Pautler, the court held that any use of deception by
an attorney was unacceptable, and publicly sanctioned a prosecutor who
lied about his identity in order to secure the surrender of a multiple axe-
murderer.
252 
A r g u





























man lives by obtaining the surrender of a rampaging murderer. Does it
make sense to justify the deception as to identity in Gitatex and Apple
Corps, which protected the property rights of wealthy corporations, but
not the lying in Pautler, which may have actually saved lives?
And while testers have been socially useful in remedying discrimi-
nation, there are many zealous lawyers who practice in other areas of the
law who undoubtedly, sincerely believe that other causes for other clients
are equally deserving and useful. Environmental lawyers may seek to
use undercover stings to combat toxic dumping; labor lawyers may seek
to infiltrate unsafe factories; and insurance lawyers may seek to unmask
insurance fraud and personal injury malingerers.
253 C o m m e r c i a l  
l a w y e r s
employ undercover investig tions in franchise, royalty, and other finan-
cial disputes.
254 
A n y  
d e b a
t e  
a b o

























250. See, e.g., Isbell &  Salvi, supra note 22; United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) (criminal investigation); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int l  Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d
456 (D.N.J. 1998) (intellectual property case); D.C. Ethics Op., supra note 220 (federal intelligence
or national security agent who is lawyer may use deceit in furtherance of "legitimate national secu-
rity goals").
251. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22; Freedman, supra note 65, at 780.
252. Pautier, 47 1
1
. 3d a t  
1 1 7 6 .
253. See, e.g., Stagg v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 162 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (undercover investigator interviewed allegedly malingering plaintiff in personal injury
case).
254. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F. 3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003)
(investigator interviewed adverse party in franchise dispute).
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substantive areas o f  the law is inherently subjective and could vary
among different areas of the country, and among persons holding differ-
ent political beliefs, and different social values. Going forward, it is not
useful for courts and ethicists to engage in a subjective ranking of these
subject-area factors.
We will turn now to a number of hypothetical examples that serve
to illustrate the limitations of and inconsistencies in existing precedents.
Hypothetical 1: Consider the example of a lawyer who wishes to
investigate an imminent environmental hazard, a toxic waste dump near
a residential neighborhood, or a potentially contaminated drinking water
supply. T h e  lawyer represents a homeowner's association or an envi-
ronmental group and wishes to obtain information about the pollution
from a local manufacturing concern that is suspected of causing the dan-
gerous condition. There is no problem under the no-contact rule, the
case is not in litigation, and the lawyer wishes to make a routine inquiry
of a low-level clerical employee. May  that lawyer directly contact the
alleged polluter under an assumed identity? Is  it different if  the lawyer
proceeds indirectly, through an investigator?
Hypothetical 2: A lawyer for a labor union hires an investigator to
pose as an employee at a factory suspected of violating OSHA regula-
tions. The manufacturer is suspected of removing safety guards on pow-
er saws and pressuring workers to curtail safety procedures.
Hypothetical 3: A government lawyer sends an undercover investi-
gator into a prison under an assumed identity in order to investigate and
infiltrate a violent gang. The investigator wears a recording device and
transmits information to the lawyer, who advises the investigator whom
to interview, what questions to ask, and what types of information to ob-
tain. The targets of the investigation are not represented by counsel.
Hypothetical 3-A: A criminal defense lawyer is searching for an
exculpatory witness in a capital case. The missing witness has a criminal
record, is a possible suspect in an unrelated investigation, and is in hid-
ing. The lawyer sends an investigator to pose as a gang member under
an assumed identity in order to win the confidence and cooperation of the
witness.
Hypothetical 4: A defense lawyer in a personal injury action repre-
sents a doctor whose alleged negligence incapacitated the plaintiff, who
claims a permanent disability from work. Learning that the plaintiff has
opened a cash retail business, the lawyer dispatches an investigator to
pose as a customer and surreptitiously tape record the allegedly incapaci-
tated plaintiff.
2008] D e c e p t i o n  in Undercover Investigations 1 6 1
 C. Analysis of Hypotheticals under Existing Law
Each of these hypothetical examples presents persuasive grounds
for permitting the use of deception, at least indirectly. However, under
traditional legal principles, only Hypothetical 3, involving an undercover
criminal investigation, is likely to be considered ethically permissible in
most jurisdictions.
255 T h e  
o t h e r  
e x a m p
l e s ,  
i n c l
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case(Hypothetical 1) and OSHA investigation (Hypothetical 2), present
important societal values that are no less significant than the civil rights
and intellectual property cases in which deception has been endorsed by
some authorities.
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use of deception under these two hypothetical&
Moreover, under existing law, it appears that the prosecutor in Hy-
pothetical 3 may ethically use an undercover investigator to gather incul-
patory evidence of a cr ime,
257 b u t  t h e  
d e f e n s e  
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may not use deception to gather exculpatory evidence in the same
case.
258 
I n  
t h













































vise an undercover investigation in Florida, Utah, and possibly the Dis-
trict of Columbia, but the defense attorney would not.
259 I n  O r e g o n  a n dIowa, the defense attorney and prosecutor alike would be able to super-
vise such a  investigation only in the event of a likely violation of civil
or criminal law. Because the prosecutor is investigating a crime under
the terms of the hypothetical, this would be ethically permissible in Ore-
gon and Iowa. But the defense attorney is merely trying to establish the
existence of a reasonable doubt as to the client's guilt. Unless the de-
fense attorney has reason to suspect and investigate a crime—such as
grand jury perjury or obstruction of justice by a government witness—
such an investigation could be unethical, even under Oregon law, which
has otherwise eliminated status-based distinctions.
260 To illustrate the problem further, consider the following additional
ypothetical example. Assume that an assistant United States attorney
(AUSA) is investigating the theft of a $500 welfare check, a federal mis-
demeanor. In an unrelated case pending in the same jurisdiction, a public
defender is representing a suspect accused of a capital crime. Under ex-
isting law in most jurisdictions, including Florida and even Oregon, the
255. See discussion supra Part IVA.
256. See discussion supra Part IV.13—C.
257. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
258. M
259. See discussion supra Part IVA—C.
260. See Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135 (2005) (stating that i t must be unlawful conduct to
justify use of deceit in an investigation). Jesse W. Barton has argued that permitting deception by
prosecutors but not defense counsel could give rise to constitutional problems. See Barton, supra
note 126.
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AUSA can ethically use undercover investigators to prosecute a misde-
meanor check theft, but the defense attorney may not ethically use the
same techniques to defend his client in a death penalty case.
26t This is a questionable result. Our adversary system is replete with
safeguards that reflect the value of protecting individual rights and pre-
venting the conviction of an innocent suspect.
262 A c c o r d i n g l y ,  
i t  s e e m s
anomalous to fo ce a defense attorney to risk professional discipline in
order to direct the kind of investigation that would be considered ethi-
cally acceptable i f  done by a prosecutor in the same case, or in a case
with much lower stakes.
263 W h i l e  
c r i m i n a l  
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additional weapons in their arsenals that are not available to criminal de-
fense lawyers,
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Some commentators have argued that prosecutors in general, and
federal prosecutors in particular, are unique in their jurisdictional and
ethical obligations,
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261. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.
262. Blackstone wrote that "i t is better that 10 guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer." Alan Vinegrad & Douglas Bloom, Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, O c t .  12,
2007, at 3 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358).
263. One Oregon criminal defense lawyer has even claimed that permitting government law-
yers, but not the defense, to supervise undercover investigations, would be so unfair as to raise con-
stitutional problems:
A criminal prosecutor could ground a prosecution on evidence obtained through covert
activity, even though the defendant's lawyer was legally prohibited from using covert ac-
tivity to disprove the prosecution evidence (or even to prove his client's innocence). This
one-way exemption from the ban on dishonest evidence gathering could violate due proc-
ess.
Barton, supra note 126. In Wardius v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of due
process to require a criminal defendant, but not the government, to give pretrial discovery of  its
witnesses. 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973). The Court held: "The State may not insist that trials be run as
a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' se-
crecy for its own witnesses." Id. I n  that case, an Oregon statute required the defense, but not the
prosecution, to reveal its witnesses prior to trial. Id. at 471. I t  is one thing to say that defendants are
ntitled to reciprocal discovery, and quite another thing altogether—and an expansion of the law—to
say that the Constitution requires a leveling of the playing field in terms of permitting access to
undercover investigations.
264. The Supreme Court has noted: "Prosecutors 'have available a terrible array of coercive
methods to obtain information,' such as 'police investigation and interrogation, warrants, informers
and agents whose activities are immunized, authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands
[and] enhanced subpoena power." Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987) (quoting C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 460 (1986)).
265. Hypothetical 4 is not clearly permissible under existing law, and raises concerns due to
the investigator's direct contact with the target in violation of the no contact provisions of Model
Rule 4.2.
266. Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green have argued (in general) that federal prosecutors
are ethically unique in that they have a nationwide mandate, report to a single executive branch
department, and are already subject to multiple layers of  regulation by the executive branch and
federal courts. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 147. Federal prosecutors are responsi-
ble to the D0.1 Office of Professional Responsibility, as well as their own licensing jurisdiction. See
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to receive special consideration as to whether they should be subject to a
patchwork of state and federal ethics rules.
267 P e r h a p s  i t  
i s  
n o t e w o r t h y  
i n
this regard that Pautler, Friedman, and Malone were all local or state
prosecutors.
268 
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lord, who merely supervised undercover operatives and agents.
279 N o n e -theless, the same slippery slope argument that applies to other subject
areas of  the law can be used to examine federal prosecutors as well.
Where is the line to be drawn? Can undercover stings be run by lawyers
for the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Department of Ho-
meland Security?
271 A n d  
i f  




















quasi-criminal sting operations? May  suspects also resort to deception?
Or are defense lawyers in actual practice held to a higher ethical standard
than prosecutors, notwithstanding all the lofty  language to the con-
trary?
272 Moreover, federal prosecutors today are not the only lawyers who
engage in  complex, multi-jurisdictional litigation and investigations.
Many cases, both private and public, and many law firms cross state bor-
ders. The Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility al-
ready employs lawyers who keep current with ethics rules in various ju-
risdictions and are available to advise field lawyers in the various U.S.
Attorneys' offices. And while it may be burdensome and inconvenient
for individual prosecutors to learn and comply with local ethics rules,
avoiding expense and inconvenience is not necessarily the loftiest goal or
sine qua non in conceptualizing and promulgating ethics rules.
273 I n  a n y
also Statement of Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. before the Sub-Committee on Crimi-
nal Justice Oversight, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (March 24, 1999), available at http://justice.
goviarchiveidagitestimonyidagcrim032499.htm.
267. See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 147. And, of course, prosecutors have spe-
ial obligations under Model Rule 3.8, including disclosure of exculpatory evidence, avoiding sub-
poenaing privileged materials and refraining from prejudicial public comments. Id. at 212.
268. See In re Pautler, 47 1
3
. 3d 1 1 7 5 ,  
1 1 7 6  
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b a n e
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1333, 1333 (111. 1979); In re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455, 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
269. See case descriptions supra Part 111.13, C.
270. See case descriptions supra Part IVA. Malone actually counseled a corrections officer to
lie, and Malone himself directly participated in creating a dummy, perjured record, along with a
parallel truthful record. Malone, 105 A.D.2d at 456-57.
271. And, as mentioned in Part IV above, Minnesota lawyer-prosecutors themselves resort to
undercover investigators in their own investigations of suspended or disbarred lawyers. See Wemz,
supra note 176.
272. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 3.8 cmt [1] ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate."); Zacharias 8c Green, supra note 147, at 227 ("[B]oth
state and federal prosecutors have been held to a higher standard than other lawyers. They are
charged with an overarching duty to seek justice.").
273. The money spent on the Abscam investigation alone was so vast and tempting that the
defense claimed that the bribes offered to congressmen and other targets of the investigation violated
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event, the point of this Article is not that we should restrict or shut down
federal criminal investigations. Rather, this Article assumes that under-
cover investigations are here to stay, but posits that the playing field
should be leveled.
The law can continue to develop on a case-by-case basis, with indi-
vidual judges or bar associations deciding intuitively which subject areas
of the law justify undercover deception on an ad hoc, "I know it when I
see it," basis. But it makes more sense to avoid such value-laden subjec-
tive categories, which vary from judge to judge and among different
parts of the country. Rather, it is more logical to focus on the conduct of
individual attorneys, regardless of their public- or private-sector status,
or the subject matter of the client's underlying claim.
D. The States Should Reconsider Status-Based Exceptions
It is time to reconsider status-based analysis of undercover investi-
gations. Status-based subject-matter factors are highly subjective, value-
laden, and political. I t  is probably not desirable to treat groups of law-
yers differently based on the status of their client as a member of the
public sector versus the private sector, or based on the subject matter of
the underlying claim or investigation.
274 Rather, it makes more sense, and is more objective, to focus on the
conduct of the attorneys themselves, as well as the investigative tech-
niques which they employ, both directly and indirectly. This  avoids a
fragmented pecking order of bar sub-disciplines, in which certain con-
duct is permitted by some lawyers in one part of the country, but not
permitted by lawyers doing different work in other parts of the country.
The need for a focus on attorney conduct is particularly relevant in light
of the growth of  multi-jurisdictional practice, sometimes by large na-
tional or international firms.
Conversely, it  is preferable, from the viewpoint of the organized
bar, for practicing lawyers to focus on the fundamental principles of ethi-
cal conduct, rather than on the subject matter of their cause or on the sta-
tus of their client. I t  is not desirable from the perspective of attorney dis-
cipline for some lawyers to think that they have to be especially careful,
for instance, in a bankruptcy proceeding, but to think that they can cast
due process. See Blecker, supra note 107; United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1984). Such expenditures would be sufficient to
fund a small army of ethics lawyers.
274. Isbell and Salvi wrote: "Nor does the nature of the supervising lawyer's client, as between
public and private entities, or the fact that in a given instance the objectives of the testers or investi-
gators are socially desirable, provide a basis for distinguishing between misrepresentations that are
ethically permissible and those that are not." Isbell & Salvi, supra note 22, at 829.
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caution to the wind in a civil rights investigation, in which anything goes.
The ends do not necessarily justify the means. I n  fact, the cases are re-
plete with examples of lawyers who were presumably so blinded with
righteous zeal that they crossed the line and lied or suborned perjury—
fundamental ethical transgressions—in pursuit o f  important law en-
forcement objectives.
275 I n  
t h i s  
r e s p e c t
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s t a t u s
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have the undesirable effect of emboldening some lawyers to cross the
line in their investigative techniques. Pautler, Friedman, and Malone
each believed that the justice of their causes justified the use of decep-
tion, and each paid a price. Their status as prosecutors may have tended
to obscure their own perceptions o f  their ethical duties as lawyers.
Moreover, there are double standards at play, as illustrated by the Ab-
scam and Operation Greylord investigations, in which federal prosecu-
tors obtained valid convictions based on investigative techniques that
might have earned reprimands for their state and local counterparts.
276 Simple and clear fundamental ethical precepts are more likely to be
remembered, followed, and enforced than the status-based criteria in the
subject-matter axis. Accordingly, this Article recommends that status-
based factors should give way to a more uniform, conduct-based analy-
sis. O n  the other hand, one might argue that status-based distinctions
have the virtue of clarity and that conduct-based analysis, like status-
based distinctions, will have to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.
Eliminating status-based distinctions will not end subjectivity or judg-
ment calls in legal ethics. Whether a particular attomey's conduct was
unduly deceptive, or worthy of discipline, will still be decided on a case-
by-case basis, depending on the background, judgment, and moral values
of an individual judge, ethicist, or disciplinary committee. However, that
decision will not depend on the happenstance of the attomey's status or
the nature of the client's claim.
And there is hardly bright-line clarity under the existing law. For
example, consider the situation in Illinois, where federal prosecutors
were permitted, in Operation Greylord, to supervise FBI agents who
committed perjury in fabricated cases as part of a sting to prosecute judi-
cial corruption.
277 A  
s t a t e  
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earlier in Illinois for similar conduct.
278 A n d  D a n i e l  
G a t t i  
w a s  
d i s c i -
plined for the same sort of conduct that was approved in writing by Ore-
275. See In re Malone, 105 A.13.2d 455, 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); In re Friedman, 392
N.E.2d 1333, 1333 (111. 1979).
276. Compare Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 with United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th
Cir. 1985).
277. Murphy, 768 F.2d at 1528.
278. Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333.
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gon state ethics authorities in response to his own complaint against the
conduct of law-enforcement agents.
279 T h u s ,  
t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  
c o n s i s t e n
c y
under existing practice.
The A B A  Model Rules o f  Professional Conduct should be
amended, along th  lines of the Oregon amendment, to permit the use of
limited deception in investigations regardless of status or subject area of
the law, provided that the investigation is necessary, the evidence is not
available by other means, the attomey's involvement is indirect, and no
other ethical rules or laws are broken.
However, as discussed infra in Part VII, the use of covert activity
should be limited to deception as to the undercover agent's identity and
purpose and should otherwise be compliant with law and the Model
Rules. We will now turn to an analysis of the sort of conduct-based fac-
tors that have been addressed by the courts and ethicists, and which
should inform future consideration of undercover investigations.
VB. AN ANALYSIS OF CONDUCT-BASED FACTORS
We will now turn to consideration of the various conduct-based fac-
tors that the courts and commentators have analyzed in determining the
propriety of undercover investigations supervised by attorneys. These
include the directness of  the attomey's involvement in the deceit, the
necessity for deception, the existence of alternative methods for obtain-
ing the same information, and compliance with other legal or ethical
rules.
A. The Direct-Indirect Dichotomy
The Model Rules say that a lawyer may not do through an interme-
diary that which is directly prohibited.
28° W h i l e  t h e  
c o u r t s  
a n d  
s t a t e  
b a r s
have not always explicitly addressed this factor, their opinions appear to
have largely depended, with some notable exceptions,
28I o n  w h e t h e r  t h eattorney acted directly or through an intermediary. Thus, in Pautler and
Gatti—two major cases disallowing deception—the attorney directly lied
to the would-be client and medical billing company, respectively.282 i n
279. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000).
280. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(a).
281. Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003).
282. In re Pautler, 47 1
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o
speculate as to whether a different result would have been obtained i f  Mark Pautler had instead
instructed a police detective to pose as the suspect's legal aid lawyer. There were so many other
problems with the District Attorney's conduct in that case that it is difficult to isolate any one factor.
The deception there was broader and deeper than necessary; it resulted in a confession that the gov-
ernment sought to use; it continued on longer than was necessary to obtain the surrender of the sus-
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cases allowing undercover operations, such as Parker, Apple Corps, Ab-






















































Parker specifically distinguished Gatti (in which the lawyer directly de-
ceived an insurance administrator) because the latter case "does not in-
volve a government attomey's supervision of agents engaged in a formal
criminal investigation."
285 
N o t w i t h s t a
n d i n g  
t h e  
p r o h i b






Rule 8.4 (a), the courts are just more lenient with attorneys who practice
their deception indirectly.
Some states have dealt with the conflict by simply amending their
rules to permit indirect supervision of undercover investigations in which
deception is used. Florida, as mentioned, permits a government lawyer
to supervise an undercover investigation in which the prosecutor does not
personally participate.
288 A n d  
O r e g o n ,  
i n  
a m e n d











of the train wreck left by the Gatti decision, authorized only lawyers'
indirect participation in undercover investigations.
287 T h e  a m e n d m e n t ,by its terms, states that it is ot unethical for lawyers to "advise clients or
others about or to supervise" others in otherwise lawful covert opera-
tions .
288 In In Re Ositis, an Oregon lawyer was reprimanded for deceiving a
non-party through an investigator who posed as a joumalist•
289 T h i s  c o n -duct took place under the pre Gatti Oregon Code, which did not contain
an exception for undercover investigations. Although the investigator
had conceived the ruse, the attorney "suggested a particular line of in-
pect; and it subverted the attorney-client relationship, destroying the suspect's trust in the legal sys-
tem.
283. In Apple Corps, one of the calls to the stamp company was made by counsel of record
using her married name. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. 1nel Collectors Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462
(D.N.J. 1998).
284. On the other hand, in Midwest Motor Sports, the court disallowed evidence obtained by
the attomey's investigator in violation of the no contact rule. See Midwest Motor Sports, 347 F.3d at
697-700.
285. See United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 478 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis add-
ed). O n the other hand, an Oregon case decided prior to the 2002 amendment of its ethics code
resulted in discipline of a private lawyer in a civil dispute who did not directly participate in an
investigation, but merely instructed an investigator to use deception. I n  re Ositis, 40 1
3
. 3d  5 0 0  ( O r .
2002). The Oregon State Bar opined that Ositis would be decided differently under the new rules.
286. FLA. RULES F Pi ton. CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c).
287. See OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4, discussed supra Part
288. The Oregon State Bar Association has interpreted the revised Rule 8.4(b) to permit super-
vision in which the lawyer does not "participate directly" in the covert activity. Or . Ethics Op.,
supra note 135.
289. In re Ositis, 40 1
3
. 3d  5 0 0  
( O r .  
2 0 0 2 ) .  
O s i t





















It would have been decided differently under the post-Gaul revisions to the Oregon Code. See Or.
Ethics Op., supra note 135, at 4 ("it appears that the lawyer's involvement with the trick interview as
an advisor and not as a direct participant would be permissible under Oregon RPC 8.4 (b).").
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quiry," "attached his own set of directions," and "exercised direction and
control" over the investigator. Thus, the lawyer's close supervision of




The Oregon State Bar Association revisited Ositis in 2005, under
the post-Gatti revisions to the Oregon ethics code.
29I A c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e
Oregon State Ba , the revised rule, permitting supervision of undercover

















































suggests that Daniel Gatti's own conduct, in posing as a chiropractor,
would still be unethical under the revised rules because he participated
directly in the deception.
293 While Oregon has reached a coherent and logical solution to the
problem of deception, its rationale is harder to explain. Intuitively, it
somehow seems worse for a lawyer to engage in deception directly than
to condone its use by others. The Oregon State Bar has explained that
"[Ole safe harbors of Oregon RPC 8.4(b) preserve the fundamental tenet
of the basic truthfulness of the words spoken by a lawyer."
294 T h e  O r e -gon Bar seems to be suggesting that it just seems undignified or wrong
for lawyers to get their hands dirty, or to engage directly in deception. Is
a wink and a nod somehow ethically different from an outright lie?
Would Ositis have escaped reprimand, even under the old Oregon code,
had he simply told his investigator to "do what you gotta do," instead of
involving himself in, and ratifying, the details of the deception?
The Article concludes that the directness of attorney participation in
he subterfuge is and should continue to be an important factor under the
conduct-based axis.
B. How Significant is the Deception?
An appropriate factor in analyzing the conduct axis is the signifi-
cance of the deception, as well as any resulting damage. The intellectual
property decisions generally have considered minimally-intrusive sting
operations, in which the investigator walks into a public retail space and,
from a low level clerk, purchases merchandise that is being sold to the
290. Compare Ositis, 40 1
3
. 3d .  a t  
3 7 5  
w i t h  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e
s  
v .  
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1988), in which an informant became the "alter ego" of the government because a prosecutor fur-
nished him with a fabricated subpoena in an effort to elicit incriminating information from the sus-
pect.
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buying public anyway. The clerk is merely selling the investigator the
same merchandise that was being sold to other customers before and af-
ter the transaction. Thus, the deception is mild or in some cases nonexis-
tent, and is limited to identity and purpose. Also, in most intellectual
property cases, the deception causes no harm to its subject, aside from
permitting the gathering of evidence. B y  the same token, Daniel Gatti
merely misrepresented his identity and purpose in telephoning the medi-
cal review company.
295 A  
d i f f e r e n t  
r e s u l
t  
o b t a i
n s  
w h e








Motor Sports, the investigator has a substantive discussion with a high-
ranking officer i  the control group of a represented party ,
296 o r  w h e n ,  a sin Poutler, the prosecutor's deception undermines the suspect's confi-
dence in the attorney-client relationship.
297 In its opinion on undercover investigations, the New York County
Lawyers Association opined that "dissemblance" is permissible and is
distinguishable from "dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation and deceit."
298The ethically permitted "dissemblance" "is limited to identity and pur-
pose and involves otherwise lawful activity undertaken solely for the
purpose of gathering evidence."
299 T h u s ,  
t h e  
N e w  
Y o r k  
C o u n t
y  
o p i n i
o n
suggests that only a limited amount of trickery or deception is permissi-
ble and that discrimination testers, at least in civil cases, should be kept
on a short leash by their supervising attorneys.
In contrast, the deception practiced in Poutler tended to undermine
the constitutional right to counsel and the attorney-client relationship in
ways that clearly disturbed the Colorado Supreme Cour t.
3N T h e  d i s t r i c tattorney could have simply kept his deception to a minimum, by saying,
for example, "I am your attorney, and you should surrender, but do not
say anything to me or anyone else about the case." Pautler could have
revealed his true identity the moment the handcuffs were secured on
Neat's wrists. The court in Poutler noted that the assistant district attor-
ney did not act promptly to disabuse his deceived "client" after securing
295. In re Gatti, 81
1
. 3d 9 6 6  
( O r .  
2 0 0 0 )
.
296. Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003) (investigator
interviewed adverse party in franchise dispute).
297. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Colo. 2002) (en bane).
298. N.Y. County Ethics Op. 737, supra note 193, at 2.
299. Id. at 1.
300. The criticism of Pautler's deception on Sixth Amendment grounds is analyzed by Rebecca
Cross in her article. Cross, supra note 62, at 223, 230. While some critics claim that Pautler's de-
ception violated the client's trust in his attorney, Cross argues that the suspect's constitutional rights
did not attach until he was in custody. Id. at 230.
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his surrender."' Thus , on the conduct axis, Pautler's deception was
broader than necessary.
C. How Necessary Is the Deception?
Necessity is an element considered explicitly or implicitly in every
treatment of deception. The classic example, as mentioned above, is the
housing discrimination tester. A  landlord or employer is very unlikely to
respond truthfully to a direct inquiry from a disclosed civil rights investi-
gator. I n  criminal investigations, terrorist and organized-crime groups
take elaborate measures to avoid detection. These criminal enterprises
cannot be penetrated and prosecuted without the use of deception.
On the other hand, deception is rarely necessary in formal litigation,
since court-supervised discovery is the primary method of developing
evidence for use at trial. I t  is difficult to imagine a judge who would ap-
preciate a resort to deception in order to circumvent a discovery order.
Thus, in Midwest Motor Sports, the court noted that the unauthorized
contact with the represented adverse party took place while discovery
was underway.
302 A n d  
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investigator to obtain confidential client materials which "could have
been subpoenaed."
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the conduct axis. Gratuitous or unnecessary deception is unlikely to pass
muster, particularly when the same information would have been avail-
able without resort to trickery.
D. Is the Deception Otherwise Illegal or Unethical?
Of course, deception, even where ethically justified, cannot be ana-
lyzed in a vacuum. Rather, attorney conduct must be considered in the
overall context of the other ethical rules. Eliminating status-based rules
does not otherwise transform or supersede the remainder of the Model
Rules. Undercover investigations are not acceptable when used to cir-
cumvent the no-contact mle,
304 o r  t o  
e l i c i t  
p r i v i l e g e
d  
m a t e r i
a l .  
L a w y
e r
lying is still proscribed by ABA Model Rule 4.1, and, under some nar-
row circumstances, a lawyer even may be disciplined under that rule for
301. Indeed, the court explicitly condemned the unnecessary continuation of Pautler's decep-
tion after the arrest: "After the immediacy of the events waned, Pautler should have taken steps to
correct the blatant deception in which he took part." Pander, 47 1
3
.3d a t  1 1 8 4 .
302. Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003).
303. In re Wood, 526 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Wisc. 2005).
304. MODEL RULES. R. 4.2 (2008).
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standing by mutely when an adverse party labors under a misconcep-
tion?
05 The use of deception by an investigator is not acceptable when used
to circumvent standing discovery orders or procedures?
06 A s  w e  h a v eseen, some but not all, aut orities hav  posited that the deception may
not rise to the level of fraud on the court, or perjury.
307 Additional issues were raised by the Hewlett-Packard corporate
scandal, in which investigators retained by corporate in-house counsel
investigated leaks from a member of the corporate board to journalists.
308Using false identities, these investigators obtained confidential telephone
records of board members, journalists, and their families.
309 To prevent future abuse o f  confidentiality, Congress passed the
Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act o f  2006, to supplement
existing prohibitions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and other consumer
privacy-protection statues?
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tigators they employ do not run afoul of these laws, and should not ex-
ploit, use, or ratify evidence obtained illegally.312
E. "Violations of Law"
As noted, the revisions to Oregon Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4
permit lawyers to supervise undercover investigators " in  the investiga-
tion of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights," subject
to the remaining provisions of the Rules?" Covert investigations may be
305. See Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should
There Be a Silent, Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 201 (example of plaintiff's lawyer
who fails to disclose death of client during settlement negotiations).
306. Wood, 526 N.W.2d 513.
307. In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (111. 1979); In re Malone, 105 A.D.2d 455 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984). O n  the other hand, many federal investigations, particularly prosecutions of judicial
corruption, involve manufactured crimes. See discussion of  Operation Greylord, supra note 107;
United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
308. Stewart, supra note 5, at 159-60.
309. Id
310. See Rohde, supra note 18; Arenz, supra note 3; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
311. See Rohde, supra note 18; Arenz, supra note 3.
312. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4(b) (2008) (stating that a lawyer may not commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other re-
spects); MODEL Rtniis R. 5.3 (2008) (stating that a lawyer must supervise non-lawyer subordinates
and may not ratify unethical conduct). But see Stagg v, New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,
556 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (stating that a lawyer may introduce evidence ob-
tained by investigator without lawyer's knowledge, even if obtained unethically, which it wasn't).
313. OR. RULES OF PROE'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b).
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to the remaining provisions of the Rules?" Covert investigations may be
ethically employed only when there is evidence of "unlawful activ ity ."
314It is not entirely clear what is meant by these phrases, which are consid-
ered interchangeable by the Oregon State Bar .
315 O r e g o n  
F o r m a l  
O p i n -
ion 2005-173 attempted to define these phrases by use of a hypothetical
example in which the lawyer's client is injured in a fall and is denied
worker's compensation benefits.
3I6 T h e  
l a w y e r  
a d v i s e s  
t h e  
c l i e n t  
t o  
s e n
d
an acquaintance, under a false pretense, to interview a purported witness
to the accident. This, according to the Oregon Bar, would be impermis-
sible because there is no underlying claim of "unlawful activity" or vio-
lation of civil or criminal laW.
317 U n l a w f u l  
a c t i v i t y  
w o u l d  
r e q u i




lation of a statutory or common-law duty, which is not the case where
there is, essentially, a no-fault standard for collecting workers' compen-
sation benefits?"
In another hypothetical, the Oregon Bar considered the case of an
assistant district attorney approached by police officers who report suspi-
cious "foot traffic" at a residence?" This  leads them to believe that
drugs are being sold at that house.
3213 B e c a u s e  
t h e r e  
i s  
" a  
r e a s o n a b
l e  
p o s -
sibility that unlawf l activity has taken place, is taking place, or will take
place in the for seeable future,"
321 t h e  
p r o s e c u t o r  
m a y  
e t h i c a l l
y  
a u t h o r
i z e
the police to send an undercover agent posing as a drug buyer to the ad-
dress.
It is not entirely clear what is accomplished by limiting the excep-
tion to situations in which the lawyer reasonably believes that "unlawful
activity" is taking place?
22 T h e  
p r a c t i c a l  
e f f e c t  
o f  
t h i s  
c l a u







undercover investigations by lawyers wielding affirmative claims, but to
deny it to lawyers defending against the same claims. Thus, in the Ore-
gon Bar's own example, a district attorney may use a covert operation to
313. OR. Ro i l s  OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b).
314.1d.
315. Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135.
316. Id.
317. The New York  County Lawyers ' Association, in Ethics Opinion 737, similarly limits the
scope of its exception to violations o f  law in specified subject-matter areas. See N.Y. County Ethics
op. 737, supra note 193.
318. Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135, at 4.
319. I d  at 1.
320. I d  at 1, 6-7.
321. I d  at 2 (quoting OR. RULES OF PROrt., CONDUCT R. 8.4(b)).
322. Compare OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) wi th N.Y. County Ethics op. 737,
supra note 193 (stating that dissemblance is l imited to "v iolation o f  civil rights or intellectual prop-
erty rights and the lawyer believes in good fai th that such violation is taking place or wi l l  take place
imminently or (b) the dissemblance is expressly authorized by law").
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investigate allegations of drug dealing.
323 B u t  t h e  
d e f e n s e  
a t t o r n e y  
i n  
t h e
same case may not resort to such techniques unless there is reason to
suspect unlawful activity, such as witness tampering or grand jury per-
jury.324 Simply locating an exculpatory witness would not justify decep-
tion. By  logical extension, the plaintiff's lawyer in a trademark or civil
rights case may use deceit, but the defense attorneys, who are merely
defending against the allegations of a violation of law in the same case,
may not. Also, consider the example of the plaintiff's lawyer in an ordi-
nary tort case based on negligence, who may use deception to investigate
the defendant's unlawful conduct. However, the defendant in the same
case may not resort to such techniques absent a reasonable belief that
there is unlawful activity—such as perjury or insurance fraud—taking
place. 325
Most troublesome of  all is the imbalance between the resources
available to the government and the defense in criminal cases, as dis-
cussed above.
326 T h e  
g o v e r






















drug dealer for selling an ounce o f  marijuana. B u t  the defense may not
use covert deception to locate a recalcitrant exculpatory witness in a
death penalty case, absent evidence of  unlawful conduct. Under  this
formulation, the defense would be allowed to dissemble in order to in-
vestigate a  cla im that a  government witness committed perjury, ob-
struc ed justice, or otherwise engaged in unlawful conduct. Moreover, i f
a defense witness becomes unavailable due to witness tampering or other
unlawful conduct, the Oregon rule would permit resort to a covert inves-
tigation. Nonetheless, if  a witness is unavailable due to simple fear, re-
calcitrance, or hostility to the defense, the Oregon formulation would not
explicitly permit deception by the defense.
327 In short, the Oregon formulation, while admirably dispensing with
status-based distinctions, probably does not go far enough. For a variety
f reasons, discussed above, the requirement that there be illegal activity
323. Or. Ethics Op., supra note 135, at 4 (prosecutor could ethically supervise police officers
in an undercover drug buy operation based upon probable cause to believe that illegal drug activity
was underway).
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Stagg v. New York City Health &  Hospitals Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990). I n Stagg, an insurance investigator posed as a potential buyer for the injured plain-
tiff's truck, and, in the course of doing so, observed the plaintiff doing things he had swore he could
not do, such as run a business. This investigation was not authorized by the defense attorney, and,
even i f it had been so authorized, would not have run afoul of the deception or no-contact rules. Id.
at 780.
326. See discussion supra Part VI.
327. As mentioned supra, a special master in Wisconsin has found no ethics violation by a
criminal defense attorney whose investigator used a ruse to trick a teenager into surrendering his
computer, which was laden with pornography. See Supreme Court referee, supra note 8.
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as a predicate to permitting supervision o f  undercover investigations
gives an advantage to the prosecution in criminal cases and to the claim-
ant in c iv il cases. T he  ethical rules should be a reciprocal two-way
street, by permitting undercover investigations without regard to the na-
ture of the underlying claim or defense.
VIM CONCLUSION
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe conduct
involving dishonesty, misrepresentation, or deception.
328 T h e y  a l s o  b a ran attorney from doing indirectly, through a proxy, that which is ethi-
cally prohibited.
329 Y e t ,  
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tors for d cades in undercover operations aimed at uncovering racial dis-
crimination, political corruption, and organized crime. More recently,
some courts and commentators have endorsed attorney involvement in
undercover investigations to prosecute intellectual property claims?"
Attorney-supervised undercover operations are unlikely to disappear any
time soon.
This Article has analyzed the use of  deception in investigations
along two axes: status-based and conduct-based. The status-based axis
considers the type of case and the status of the lawyer supervising the
investigation (e.g., a government lawyer supervising a criminal investi-
gation). The conduct-based axis considers the actual conduct of the at-
torney: Was the deception necessary, was it direct or indirect, did it cause
unnecessary harm? Some courts and commentators have argued that no
deception should ever be permitted by attorneys, whether they act di-
rectly or indirectly. However, the recent trend has been to permit law-
yers to supervise, and thereby indirectly participate in, undercover inves-
tigations in three substantive areas of the law: criminal, civil rights, and
intellectual property. Many jurisdictions permit undercover criminal in-
vestigations by government attorneys, but are silent about the rights of
defense counsel to use deception.
This Article has argued that status-based distinctions are no longer
useful because they are highly subjective and provide little guidance to
practicing attorneys, courts, or bar associations. Why  should law en-
forcement attorneys, who theoretically are held to a higher ethical stan-
dard than private practitioners, be permitted ethically to supervise under-
cover operations when the same techniques are ethically off-limits for
defense attorneys? Furthermore, there is  no reason why intellectual
328. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(0(2008).
329. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(a).
330. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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property lawyers should ethically be able to supervise investigations that
real property lawyers may not.
In addition, using a status-based approach to ethics actually could
lead to unethical conduct by promoting a false sense of ethical immunity
among prosecutors and other status-based practitioners. Status-based
ethical immunity can lead to arrogance, or at least faulty judgment, by
lawyers who have convinced themselves that the ends justify the means.
That could be one of the lessons of Friedman, Malone and Pautler, all of
which involved prosecutors who were disciplined for using deception in
support of laudable goals in subject-matter areas in which some decep-
tion traditionally has been tolerated.
Thus, status-based distinctions no longer make sense and should be
reconsidered. T h e  effect of  the recent rule amendments in Oregon,
promulgated in the wake of In re Gatti, has been to eliminate such dis-
tinctions. Attorneys in all areas of the law should be judged by the same
ethical standards, based on the lawyers' actual conduct as opposed to the
status of their clients. Status-based hierarchies should give way to con-
duct-based rules. Lawyers' conduct should be guided by a number of
conduct-based factors, such as: (a) the directness of  the lawyer's in-
volvement in the undercover subterfuge; (b) the significance and depth of
the deception; (c) the necessity of the deception; (d) the existence of al-
ternative means to uncover the sought-after evidence; and (e) whether the
conduct violates other rules and principles, such as the no-contact rule of
ABA Model Rule 4.2. The ABA Model Rules should be amended to
permit undercover investigations, regardless of the status of the supervis-
ing attorney, provided that the investigation is necessary, the evidence is
not available by other means, the attomey's involvement is indirect, and
no other ethical rules or laws are broken.
By focusing on attorney conduct rather than client status, the debate
can return to awareness of and standards for attorney ethics for the entire
bar. Such a debate, to be sure, will not eliminate subjectivity and judg-
ment calls. Nonetheless, shifting the analysis to attorney conduct is pref-
erable to an endless, politically-charged debate about which clients'
rights are sufficiently important to justify trickery and deception by their
lawyers.
